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"Garbage In, Garbage Out":
The Litigation Implosion Over the
Unconstitutional Organization and
Jurisdiction of the
City Court of Atlanta
by Edward C. Brewer, III*
I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not
desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The City Court of Atlanta, the primary traffic court for Atlanta,
Georgia, has exercised jurisdiction since 1996 over more than one million
traffic violations and, since 1988 and under two statutes, some fifty
thousand nontraffic misdemeanors. 2 The City Court's first predecessor,
* Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1979); The University of the South (Sewanee)
(B.A., 1975). Private practice, Atlanta, Georgia, 1982 to 1996. Thanks are due to Professor
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., the Carter Professor of Torts and Insurance Law at the University
of Georgia, Professor Leslie C. Kelleher of the University of Richmond, and Professor
Richard A. Bales of Salmon P. Chase College of Law for their respective comments on the
manuscript; Tamara Miano of the Northern Kentucky Law Review for her timely research
assistance; various persons in the State of Georgia who provided helpful information and
comments, whose names are respectfully withheld; the Editors and Staff of the Mercer Law
Review for their suggestions and assistance; and Karen Pape of Chase, for everything she
does. The Author is entirely responsible for the contents of this Article.
1.

HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849).

2. The National Center for State Courts has estimated that the City Court annually
'receives approximately 230,000 new traffic filings (an average of about 913 per day)." 1
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT SERVICES DIVISION, A MANAGEMENT REVIEW
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the Traffic Court of Atlanta, adjudicated traffic law violations from 1955
to 1967' and was replaced in 1967 by a second court, also known as the
City Court, which existed until 1996.' That City Court's jurisdiction
was expanded in 1988 to include nontraffic misdemeanors arising from
the same occurrence as the traffic violation.5 In 1996 the City Court
was "re-create[d]" as "a system of state courts," and its same-occurrence
misdemeanor jurisdiction was included within the new court's jurisdiction.6 In its various incarnations over forty-five years, the City Court
has proven to be a highly efficient and effective forum for resolving
traffic cases.
An earlier article 7 suggested that the 1988 and 1996 City Court
statutes are unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Most simply, the
1996 "recreation" of the City Court as a state court and the 1988 and
1996 grants of same-occurrence misdemeanor jurisdiction violate Articles
III, VI, and XI of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.' The result is that
either the court's entire jurisdiction from 1996 to the present, the court's
same-occurrence misdemeanor jurisdiction from 1988 to the present, or
both, have been and are being exercised unconstitutionally. This article
will discuss the analytical underpinnings of the state court litigation
that can be expected to follow in the wake of the court's constitutional
and jurisdictional problems.
A.

Recent Developments in the City Court of Atlanta
In July 1998 the Court Services Division of the National Center for
State Courts ("NCSC") began a study of the City Court of Atlanta, which
culminated in January 2000 in a three-volume report entitled A

25 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter "NCSC MANAGEMENT
As of mid-1999, the City Court stated it handled a total of 270,000 misdemeanor
and ordinance cases annually. Telephone Message (Outgoing) at (404) 658-6940 (Apr. 12,
1999). In 1998 the City Court handled 4310 same-occurrence misdemeanor cases under
the laws pertaining to marijuana possession, carrying a concealed weapon, carrying a pistol
without a permit, having an open container, being a minor in possession of alcohol, and
providing false information to an officer., CITY CT. STATISTICAL REP. (1998).
3. 1955 Ga. Laws 2318 (repealed 1967), proposed to constitutionalize 1956 Ga. Laws
415, ratified, 1956 Ga. Laws, Executive Minutes 253 (no. 3); see also City of Atlanta v.
Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 90 S.E.2d 583 (1955).
4. 1967 Ga. Laws 963, proposed to constitutionalize 1967 Ga. Laws 3360, ratified, 1969
Ga. Laws, Executive Minutes 4402, 4406 (no. 23). The court was continued by 1986 Ga.
Laws 4820.
5. 1988 Ga. Laws 261.
6. 1996 Ga. Laws 627.
7. Edward C. Brewer, III, The City Court of Atlantaand The 1983 Georgia Constitution:
Is the Judicial Engine Souped Up or Blown Up?, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 941, 1017 (1999).
8. Id. at 1017-29.
OF THE CITY COURT OF ATLANTA
REVIEW"].
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Management Review of the City Court of Atlanta.9 The NCSC Management Review made 211 recommendations for improved administration of
the City Court,"0 over forty of which were implemented by May 2000
and almost eighty of which were addressed in the court's 2000 budget.
The report covers the subjects of organization, workflow, finance,
records, forms analysis, automation, and caseflow 2 An early draft of
the Management Review, which was submitted to the City Court,
resulted in the preparation of a Revised Draft dated December 1999,
reflecting comments made by the City Court of Atlanta Management
Study Task Force Committee ("the Task Force") in a Final Master List
of Errata,("FinalMaster List") dated October 1, 1999.13 It appears the
Task Force thought the Court Services Division was critical of the City
Court's management and operation. In any event, the Task Force was
critical of the earlier draft, which it said contained "errors which seem
pervasive throughout the entire report" and "errors ...identified as to
a specific page or to a specific 'Recommendation' because it presents a
conclusion based upon some incorrect or inaccurate premise." 4 The
Task Force maintained, in language from which the title of this Article
is partly derived, that "[s]everal of the errors are of such a significant
nature as to substantially alter the conclusions drawn from this wrong
input. 'Garbage In; Garbage Out."' 15

9. NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2.
10. See 3 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2.
11. See Letter from the Honorable Robert E. Bray, Director, City Court of Atlanta, to
Edward C. Brewer, III (May 26, 2000) (on file with author).
12. See 1 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, at Table of Contents.
13.

A MANAGEMENT

REVIEW OF THE CITY COURT OF ATLANTA. NATIONAL CENTER FOR

STATE COURTS [hereinafter "REVISED DRAFT"]. The draft describes the actions taken in
response to the City Court's Final Master List of Errata to the Management Study of
National Center for State Courts [hereinafter "FINAL MASTER LIST") by the City Court of
Atlanta Management Study Task Force Committee.
14. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 1.
15. Id. While on the subject of "wrong input," there is an interesting problem of
geographic jurisdiction and venue in traffic cases arising at the Hartsfield International
Airport, which the FinalMasterList inadvertently unearths (for those otherwise unfamiliar
with the City Court). The FinalMasterList points out that the City Court is multijurisdictional and that "[tihe boundaries of the city of Atlanta are in Fulton and DeKalb Counties
and there is a small portion in Clayton County located at the Hartsfield [Atlanta]
International Airport." FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 3. If this proposition means
that the City Court takes jurisdiction over traffic cases arising at the main terminal at
Hartsfield, then the City Court is in error in doing so because no published judicial
authority supports the City Court's exercise of jurisdiction over a Hartsfield traffic
misdemeanor case. Although the supreme court has held the City of Atlanta has
substantive authority under O.C.G.A. section 6-3-27 to regulate police activities at
Hartsfield extraterritorially, its decision did not involve judicial jurisdiction or venue of the
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This Article, like the earlier article, is based on the same premises as
those that led the City Court to request that the management study be
conducted."6 "Knowing that the time had come for the court to make
serious changes and to be given meaningful direction, [the City Court]
decided to undertake a task which most courts may not have the courage
to entertain."1 7 The Task Force correctly argued:
Hardly [ever] does any organization hang its dirty laundry for all to
see. However, our court believes that the false gods of vanity and pride
must be set aside if changes are to occur for the common good of all.
If a dialogue without rigorous honesty cannot exist, then real solutions
cannot be forged. 8
Perhaps the City Court's courageous undertaking will include a selfexamination of the dirty laundry of its own unconstitutional existence
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, under B & D Fabricators
v.D.H. Blair Investment Banking Corp., 9 the City Court has the same
duty as an appellate court to examine its own jurisdiction. °
The first case that raised the issue was Georgia v. Wickham.2' In
Wickham the City Court, without requesting any briefs on the issues,
summarily denied a motion to dismiss or to transfer to the State Court
of Fulton County based in part on the arguments raised in the earlier
article.2 2 If those decisions are any indication of the approach being
taken, then the City Court's response to these critical constitutional

City Court of Atlanta. See Executive Town & Country Serv., Inc. v. Young, 258 Ga. 860,
861, 376 S.E.2d 190, 191 (1989).
16. 1 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. The Task Force stated:
This court recognizes that it is a court of first impression to [sic] the justice system
for most citizens of this state. Accordingly, it fully recognizes its responsibility to
the public for access to it. It is an established principle of any democracy that the
judicial branch of government provides the greatest access and participation by
its citizens. The court recognizes that because very few courts have allowed
themselves to be examined in such a courageous way that data of a comparable
nature does not exist until more courts perform their own self-examination before
imploding upon themselves.
FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 1. The Task Force's very apt image of "implosion,"
like the Task Force's epithetical description of the earlier draft report, contributed to the
title of this Article. See supra notes 5, 13, and accompanying text.
17. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 1.
18. Id.
19. 220 Ga. App. 373, 469 S.E.2d 683 (1996).
20. Id. at 375, 469 S.E.2d at 686.
21. No. 200424 (City Court of Atlanta, motion to transfer heard May 24, 2000 and
amended May 26, 2000, to add motion to dismiss). The Author is counsel of record in the
Georgia Supreme Court.
22. Id.
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concerns about its existence and jurisdiction would seem to have more
in common with the "false gods of vanity and pride" than with "rigorous
honesty," leaving "the common good of all" unrealized and "real
solutions" unforged.23
The Task Force did make several observations on the merits that may
be instructive in the litigation of the constitutional issues of the court's
existence and jurisdiction. The Final Master List clearly states the City
Court is a special court of Georgia, not a state court and not a municipal
court:
It is apparent from the entire study that the state law which created
this court, and which describes the duties and functions of the chief
judge and other court personnel, was either ignored or not acknowledged. Throughout the report, recommendations are made based upon
the court being some type of municipal court, while in other instances,
it appears that there are efforts to treat the court as a state court.
This court is neither a state court as defined by the Georgia Constitution and state statutes,[24 ] nor a municipal court created by City
Charter.[25] It is a special court, created by the state legislature
under the powers of the Georgia Constitution and given state court

23.

FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 1.

24. The City Court's 1996 statute and its constitutional amendments do not
demonstrate that it is one of the courts listed in article VI, section 1, paragraph 1 of the
1983 Georgia Constitution. Brewer, supra note 7, at 1019. It is curious, indeed mystifying,
that the City Court's current letterhead reads as follows: "CITY COURT OF ATLANTA,
A STATE COURT." See Letter from Edward L. Baety, Chief Judge, City Court of Atlanta
(Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with author), to various invitees, regarding "a public hearing to be
held on Friday, April 28, 2000." The NSCS states that the court should "[flormulate a
budget position with the city that is based upon the unique legal status of the Court as a
State Court". 3 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, at 8. The final report also

noted under Recommendation 43 that:
[tihe court has a unique legal status in Georgia and proclaims itself a state court.
Yet, it is very much within the city orbit and treated like a city agency. The court
has threatened to invoke inherent powers in the recent budget struggle with the
city. The court appears to be reconsidering the budgetary implication of its legal
status as a state court.
1 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, at 63; see Trisha Renaud, Judges Sue City
Over Traffic Court Funding, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 12, 2000, at 1, 8. One

surmises that one of the City Court's most important original attributes, its ability to
generate revenue for the City of Atlanta, continues to figure into its existence and
operations within the political systems of the State of Georgia and the City of Atlanta, see
Brewer, supra note 7, at 990 (citing City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 114, 90 S.E.2d
583, 586 (1955)).
25. However literally accurate this statement may be, it is of course incomplete at best
because article VI, section 10, paragraph 1(5) of the Georgia Constitution, along with other

provisions of law, suggests that the City Court is a Municipal Court. See Brewer, supra
note 7, at 1004.
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jurisdiction, to handle a high volume of cases. Such courts may be
created in all Georgia cities with populations of 300,000 or more based
upon the last census.[ 26 ] Initially, this court was created in 1967.
However, being the only court of its kind in the entire state, through
the years of its existence, laws became effective for "state courts",
"superior" courts, "probate" courts and "magistrate" courts that did not
include or reference this court. These other courts can be found in
many jurisdictions, but this unique court only flourished in the City of
Atlanta.[27 ] Therefore, in order to understand and fully appreciate

26. A small but critical correction is in order, because the 1967 and 1986 amendments
purport to permit the creation of such courts only in cities over 300,000, and the Task
Force apparently is quoting from one of the City Court statutes rather than the
amendment. See Brewer, supra note 7, at 996-97 n.392 (citing 1967 Ga. Laws 3360, 336061). More importantly, with due respect, it is difficult to justify this reference to "all
Georgia cities" when the only city in Georgia over 300,000 is Atlanta. The next largest city
is Columbus at 178,683 as of the revised 1990 census data, and the Supreme Court of
Georgia held in Lomax v.Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 408 S.E.2d 788 (1991) that the 300,000
population bracket could only have been intended to refer to the City of Atlanta. Id. at
581, 408 S.E.2d at 792-93; see also Brewer, supra note 7, at 989. The General Assembly
may have said the same thing in the 1996 Act, 1996 Ga. Laws 627, but saying something
incorrect twice does not make it so.
27. The Task Force's statement is a telling admission that the City Court is not (as it
cannot be) part of the uniform system of article VI courts in Georgia. See Brewer, supra
note 7, at 1021-22. That being so, the Task Force had to look (indeed, some seem to have
had to travel) outside Georgia to California to find a court that it regarded as of like kind
with the City Court-the City of Los Angeles Traffic Court. See FINAL MASTER LIST, supra
note 13, at 3 (adverting to judges' trip to Los Angeles and conclusion therefrom that they
found it to be a much more comparable court than those selected by the National Center
study team). The NCSC apparently either rejected the comparison or lacked comparative
information because it did not include the Los Angeles Municipal Court in the final report.
Id. One would not be surprised to find that the NCSC simply decided to avoid any
potential that more charges of "garbage in, garbage out" might be leveled at any detailed
comparisons. See text accompanying supra note 15.
A 1962 report on the Traffic Court of Atlanta, the grandparent of the present City Court,
noted that the then Detroit Recorder's Court was similar to that earlier Atlanta court. See
Brewer, supra note 7, at 993. It is unknown whether that Detroit court ever flourished,
although the Detroit court's juridical provenance seems more conducive to its flourishing
than does the present City Court's. Constitutionality being of course the point of the
matter, both the parallels and the nonparallels in the Detroit and Atlanta courts' histories
are instructive. Both were, or are, traffic courts, but there end the constitutionally
significant similarities. Effective September 1, 1981, the Detroit court's traffic and
ordinance division became part of the state-level District Court for the 36th District. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS section 600.9941 (1987). Effective October 1, 1997, the court was
"abolished and merged with the third judicial circuit of the circuit court." Id. § 600.9931
(Supp. 1999); see id. § 726.1 (1993 & Supp. 1999) (providing statutory history of subject
matter jurisdiction). The latter transfer of jurisdiction was upheld as constitutional in
Kuhn v.Secretary of State, 579 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), and the federal
courts refused to hear a related case on grounds of res judicata with overtones of Pullman
abstention. Kuhn v. Miller, No. 98-2012 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 1999). (The City of Detroit lies
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the unique nature of our court, it is strongly requested that the entire
copy of the Act .creating the court be referred to and attached as an
Appendix to the Final Study.28
The Task Force later repeated its assessment that "[tihe court is not a
municipal entity such as The Atlanta Municipal Court."29 However, the
Task Force made clear that "the cases handled by the court are
overwhelmingly classified as misdemeanors.
In addition to traffic
misdemeanors, this court also tries other misdemeanors that arise out
of the traffic stop. In reality there are very few city 'ordinance'
violations that are filed in the City Court of Atlanta."" The Task Force
remarked that "there are some states that do not treat their traffic cases
the same as criminal cases. Georgia, like most states, is not one of those
jurisdictions. Therefore, the Court must follow the procedures outlined
in our state statutes including the criminal procedure laws."31

entirely within Wayne County, which partly explains the ability to transfer jurisdiction to
a circuit with county-wide jurisdiction. The district court has city-wide jurisdiction,
suggesting that the task of granting it traffic jurisdiction was easier than Georgia's
reconfiguration of the City Court will be.) During the same timeframe as the Detroit
Recorder's Court was being properly integrated into the Michigan state court system, the
City Court of Atlanta's constitutional problems were mounting. See Brewer, supra note 7,
at 999-1003.
28. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 1-2. The 1996 Act was included inthe final
report. For a copy of the entire Act, see 2 NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, App.
L.
29. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 2. But see supra notes 24, 25.
30. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 2-3. The Task Force's reference to nontraffic
misdemeanors "that arise out of the traffic stop" contains a latent ambiguity, in that
according to criminal defense attorneys who regularly practice in the City Court, the court
will take jurisdiction over and try a nontraffic misdemeanor even when there is not a
traffic offense. Even assuming that the nontraffic jurisdiction did not run afoul of the City
Court's constitutional provisions, the court's claim to jurisdiction over a "non-traffic
misdemeanor only," or in the Task Force's colloquial phrase, "traffic stop" case, violates
even the plain and patent language of the 1988 and 1996 acts, which state that the court
has jurisdiction over "[aill crimes and offenses under the laws of the state relating to and
regulating traffic, and all other crimes and offenses arising out of the same occurrence as
such traffic offense." 1999 Ga. Laws 831, § 1; 1996 Ga. Laws 627, § 3(1), (2); 1988 Ga.
Laws 262, § 3. The only equivalency between an "offense" and a "stop" in this context is
that the constitutional "offense" of the City Court's lack of existence and subject matter
jurisdiction should be "stopped." One could of course take the Task Force's equating the
two terms (or the City Court's acceptance of jurisdiction over those cases at all) as a form
of statutory analysis predicated on the view that anyone "stopped" must be guilty of some
"offense," but that proposition runs afoul of other basic principles of the law. See generally
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Hodo v. State, No. S99A1557, 2000 WL 306480
(Ga. Mar. 27, 2000).
31. FINAL MASTER LIST, supra note 13, at 2-3. The NCSC Management Review notes:
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Furthermore, the City Court must also follow the principles of Georgia
law governing courts with limited constitutional and criminal jurisdiction. 2
B.

Nature and Scope of the PresentArguments
The City Court's unconstitutionality presents a significant' and
pressing question for the judges and solicitor of the City Court, for past,
present, and future City Court defendants and their attorneys, and for
the State of Georgia: What is to be done? The Judicial Engine article
proposed solutions for the General Assembly in restructuring the City
Court in a constitutional manner by recreating a Traffic Division for the
Municipal Court of Atlanta as part of more comprehensive legislation
33
affecting municipal courts in three or more large counties in Georgia.
This Article addresses the state procedural alternatives that criminal
defendants have for bringing direct and collateral challenges against the
City Court's judgments and that the Georgia courts, for their part, have
available for managing the litigation that may be anticipated.
The methods for challenging a court's existence, a court's jurisdiction,
or a judge's authority to take judicial action may be divided into two
general categories:
direct and collateral challenges.34 The direct
challenges may lie in the trial court or on appeal, and the primary
question is whether the defendant must raise the issue "in the first
instance" before the court whose existence or jurisdiction, or the judge

It is rare that a traffic court has jury trial calendars with as many cases as are
listed in the City Court of Atlanta. The court operates like a full-blown criminal
court with hundreds of people on probation, two jury trial courts in full swing,
court reporters, bail bondsmen, and numerous bailiffs, but in terms of security and
layout the court is not well adapted to a criminal role. The budget is inflated by
this criminal orientation, which is present to a limited extent in many traffic
courts, but not usually to the extent found in Atlanta. Because so many traffic
cases are treated as misdemeanors under state law, the incidence ofjury trials is
high for a traffic court (see 1996 Georgia Laws, 627 et seq., on jury trial
requirements) [sic].
NCSC MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 2, at 69.
32. See Brewer, supra note 7, passim; infra notes 44-53 (subject matter jurisdiction),
54-112 (unconstitutional existence) and accompanying text.
33. See Brewer, supra note 7, at 1042-44.
34. The term collateral challenge is used here to describe any original proceeding
separate from that giving rise to the judgment being challenged, in which the validity of
the judgment is at issue. There is probably a good argument that the unlawfulness of the
judge's actions, not the judgment itself, is at issue in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a judge who acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, but the resolution
of that argument is not necessary to this Article.
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whose authority, is being challenged. 5 The collateral challenges
include the writ of habeas corpus.36
The law of direct and collateral challenges to the City Court's
judgments, although complex, provides fairly clear answers for criminal
defendants and courts in Georgia. Georgia is one of two states in the
United States (the other is Colorado) in which the judgments of an
unconstitutional de facto court are void and may be challenged not only
by raising the issue in the trial court in the first instance but also by
raising it both directly on appeal and collaterally on habeas corpus, even
though no objection to the court's existence has been raised in the trial
court. Thus, besides the obvious approach of raising the issue in the
City Court, the criminal defendant may raise the issue for the first time
on appeal or in a state habeas proceeding, perhaps including a class
action. This principle, like the similar principle applicable to the City
Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over same-occurrence
misdemeanors, is deeply embedded in the provisions of the Georgia
Constitution and the history of the Georgia court system, and it is not
likely to be dislodged even, or perhaps especially, by the need for
expediency created by the large number of defective judgments that the
City Court has rendered. This Article will address those issues as they
arise in the state courts, leaving aside the question of federal court
involvement in the City Court's problems.
II.

THE NATURE OF THE DEFECTS IN THE CITY COURT

In the absence of a court with constitutional existence under state law
and having subject matter jurisdiction constitutionally granted, judicial
exercise of criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction presents problems that lie
at the core of the authority of any state judicial system. The City Court
of Atlanta's existential and jurisdictional defects are fundamental
organic problems that are products of the unconstitutionality of the acts
creating and empowering the City Court. Article I, section II, paragraph
V of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides that "[1]egislative acts in
violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are
void, and the judiciary shall so declare them." The provision has
constitutional antecedents that go back to the 1861 Georgia Constitution,
which is the first constitution approved after the Supreme Court was
created in 1845,"' and the later Georgia constitutions in 1865,38

35. See infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 197-278 and accompanying text. Due to space limitations, this
article will not address declaratory judgments or the extraordinary writs.
37. GA. CONST.of 1861, art. I, § 17 ("Legislative Acts in violation of the fundamental
law are void; and the Judiciary shall so declare them."). See 1845 Ga. Laws 18.
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1868,' 9 1877,40 1945,"' and 1976.42 It has earlier judicial antecedents in the rule of judicial review as stated in Nunn v. State,43 decided
by the Georgia Supreme Court during its first term; in McLeod v.
Burroughs;44 and in earlier decisions of the Superior Courts in 1809,
1815, 1822, and 1830. 4' The specificity of the provision goes beyond
creating a rule of judicial review, however and as discussed further
below, it provides expressly that an unconstitutional legislative act is
void, which under Georgia decisions means that the Act has no legal
effect whatsoever.46
A. The City Court's Lack of Subject Matter JurisdictionOver SameOccurrence Misdemeanors
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 17-9-441
provides that "[t]he judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the
person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity
and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the
interest of the parties to consider it." It is well settled in Georgia that
when a court of limited jurisdiction lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
a prosecution, its judgment rendered in the case is void under O.C.G.A.
section 17-9-4 and is subject to collateral attack.48 As early as 1848 in

38. GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 13 ("Legislative acts in violation of the Constitution are
void, and the Judiciary shall so declare them.").
39. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 32. The 1868 and later versions are in the same form
as the modern language.
40. GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 4, para. 2.
41. GA. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 4, para. 2.
42. GA. CONST. of 1976, art. I, § 2, para. 8.
43. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
44. 9 Ga. 213 (1851). The decision in McLeod is interesting in part because it was
included in an early treatise on Georgia constitutional law, ALBERT BERRY SAYE &
CHARLES JOSEPH HILKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GEORGIA 239 (1952).
45. ALBERT BERRY SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA 1732-1945, at 188-95
(1948). Professor Saye notes that by resolution in 1858, 1858 Ga. Laws 74, the General
Assembly placed judicial decisions on an equal footing with its enactments, which he called
"a striking contrast to the action of the legislature in 1815 censuring the judges for
usurping power [in declaring two statutes unconstitutional]." Id. at 194. Interestingly,
Saye traces the power to invalidate unconstitutional acts to the 1877 Georgia Constitution,
and does not reference the provisions in force from 1861 to 1868. It appears that there
were no similar provisions in the 1777, 1789 or 1798 Georgia Constitutions. See T.R.R.
COBB'S NEW DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA 1111-26 (1851) (1798 Constitution); PRINCE'S
DIGEST 902-13 (1837) (same).
46. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5.
47. O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4 (1997).
48. See Fleming v. Lowry, 173 Ga. 894, 162 S.E. 144 (1931); Wright v. Davis, 120 Ga.
670, 48 S.E. 170 (1904); see also infra notes 197-278 and accompanying text (habeas corpus
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Bostwick v.Perkins, Hopkins & White,49 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that a judgment entered in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is "unquestionably void, and a nullity." ° In 1850 in Rodgers v.
Evans,5 1 the court held that "[a] judgment of a Court which has no
jurisdiction of the cause, is entirely void."52 The question of the City
Court's authority over same-occurrence misdemeanors is53 definitely a
question of subject matter jurisdiction under Georgia law.
B.

The City Court's Lack of Existence Under the De Facto Doctrines
1. Summary of the Georgia Decisions

The de jure and de facto doctrines describe, in the judicial context,
whether a court, judge, or other officer has the authority to conduct
judicial business under the constitution and laws of the jurisdiction, in
this case the State of Georgia.54 At least three de facto doctrines exist
that appear in the Georgia cases.55 These doctrines apply when: (1)

decisions).
49. 4 Ga. 47 (1848).
50. Id. at 49.
51. 8 Ga. 143 (1850).
52. Id. at 145.
53. Brewer, supra note 7, at 1039-40.
54. The term "authority" is used here, in preference to the Georgia courts' usual term
"power," Metropolitan St. R.R. v. Powell, 89 Ga. 601, 16 S.E. 118 (1982), because the two
terms mean very different things in jurisprudential analysis. The judicial system is
created by "secondary rules empowering individuals to make authoritativedeterminations
of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has been broken."
Authority thus differs from the "mere power of man over man," itself inadequate as a
foundation of social order, in that authority consists of that power legitimized by its formal
acceptance by and among the citizens of a state. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 9697, 202-03 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added). The constitutional definitions of and restraints
on state action are, of course, precisely what distinguishes power from authority in the
Georgia court system. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1-2; Christiensen v. State, 266 Ga.
474, 489, 468 S.E.2d 188, 198 (1996) (Sears, J., dissenting) (stating Georgia constitution
"preserv[es the] social contract"); In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606 (1846). Whatever the usage,
the Georgia courts have consistently demanded that any and all uses of power by a state
entity be justified by reference to whether they have been authorized.
55. The de facto doctrines apply to a large number of circumstances involving
constitutional, statutory, and procedural defects in a public entity's exercise ofjurisdiction,
and to reduce these to two or three principles (even as applicable to one type of entity, such
as a court) usually requires oversimplification. The de facto officer doctrine is the subject
of an annotation at Annot., De jure office as condition of a de facto officer, 99 A.L.R. 294
(1935), but it appears that the de facto court doctrines have not been annotated in their
own right. In this Article the decisions of the federal and other state courts are considered
primarily as they may bear on the solution of the problems presented by the City Court of
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there is no state statute providing for the court, so that the court does
not exist "under color of state law"; (2) a statute exists creating the

court, but the statute is unconstitutional; and (3) there is a statute,
constitutional or otherwise, providing for the court and office, but the
judge or officer's appointment, election, tenure, or other claim of
authority is unlawful, unconstitutional, or otherwise defective.56 The
first two situations are usually referred to, again in the judicial context,
as the de facto court doctrines, and they will be distinguished in this
Article by the terms "nonstatutory de facto court" and "unconstitutional
de facto court." The third situation is usually referred to as the de facto
judge or de facto officer doctrines, and those doctrines will be distinguished by the terms "nonstatutory de facto judge" or "officer" and
"unconstitutional de facto judge" or "officer." That there is a difference
between the de facto court doctrines on the one hand and the de facto
judge doctrines on the other is well accepted.57 In Smith v. Langford,58 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the question of a senior
judge's ability to exercise judicial authority under the Constitution does
not involve the same question as the establishment of a separate judicial
forum.59
The Georgia courts have addressed all three situations covered by the
de facto doctrines. The de facto court doctrines are significant here for
three purposes: (1) the consequences of a court's lack of de jure existence
or authority; (2) the necessity of a defendant's objecting to the exercise
of de facto authority prior to judgment; and (3) the availability of a
collateral attack on the judgment, for example, the writ of habeas
corpus. Further, at least under the de facto court doctrines in Georgia,
it is significant whether the purported judicial action occurs in a civil
case or in a criminal case. Regardless of what other jurisdictions may
decide, the Georgia courts are clear on the issues of a court's constitu-

Atlanta. See infra notes 114-88 and accompanying text.
56. The court in State v. Carroll,38 Conn. 449 (1871) breaks down the de facto judge
category still further, but the City Court's problems relate to its own existence and
authority, not the authority of its judges, and in any event the analysis in the decision in
Carrollis inconsistent in numerous regards with that of the Georgia courts. See infra text
accompanying notes 170-88.
57. The distinction is the same as that between the writs of prohibition and quo
warranto, to the extent that the former lies to determine whether an official's actions are
lawful and constitutional, whereas the latter lies to challenge the right of a person to hold
public office. See infra note 197. The writ of prohibition was used to challenge de facto
courts in Logan v. Harris,210 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1948) and Tobler v. Beckett, 297 So. 2d 59
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
58. 271 Ga. 221, 518 S.E.2d 884 (1999).
59. Id. at 224, 518 S.E.2d at 887.
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tional authority under a criminal statute. Under article I, section II,
paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution and O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4, if
a court is found to lack constitutional existence or jurisdiction, the
court's judgments are "void for any other cause," and the court's
unconstitutionality need not be raised in the initial proceedings and may
be raised on collateral attack of the judgment.6 °
a. The De Facto Court Doctrines in Georgia. In Murray v. State,"'
the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the unlawfulness of a nonstatutory de facto court.6 2 A county court operated in Washington County in
1895, purportedly pursuant to the 1872 county courts statute, 63 despite
that county's exclusion from the statute by a local act. 4 The supreme
court determined that the county court had not been authorized by
statute and adverted to the argument that "the consequences to result
from a holding that the court was illegally established would be, to many
persons, very disastrous."65 The court concluded:
It is said that the authority of the court should be sustained for the
reason that the persons assuming to be officers thereof were acting
under color of law, and that their acts would be valid as the acts of de
facto officers. Without attempting now to decide the question as to
whether there can be such a thing as a de facto court, so far as
property rights which are sought to be affected by the judgment of such
a court are concerned, we are clear that in a case involving the liberty
of the citizen there can be no such thing as a de facto court, where the
jurisdiction and authority sought to be exercised are questioned at the
threshold of the proceeding, as was done in the present case by a plea
to the jurisdiction, filed on arraignment.66
Whether the authority of a de facto court must be "questioned at the
threshold of the proceeding" or whether this was no more than descrip-

60. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5; O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4.
61. 112 Ga. 7, 37 S.E. 111 (1900).
62. Id. at 11, 37 S.E. at 113.
63. 1871-1872 Ga. Laws 288-98 (county courts statute, requiring grand jury

recommendation).
64. 112 Ga. at 8, 37 S.E. at 112. 1872 Ga. Laws 478 (Aug. 28, 1872) (excluding
Washington County). On the county courts of Georgia, see Brewer, supra note 7, at 949,
953, 957-58.
65. 112 Ga. at 13, 37 S.E. at 114.
66. Id. at 12,37 S.E. at 114 (emphasis added); see Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177,
183-86 (1995) (distinguishing between civil and criminal cases for purposes of de facto
judge doctrine).
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tive of what had occurred in Murray and need not occur in order to
preserve error will be considered below.s7
The question left open in Murray on the juridical possibility of a de
facto court was answered in the negative in Wright v. Davis.6" Wright
involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner argued that
the City Court of Wrightsville was unconstitutionally created and,
therefore, an unconstitutional de facto court.6 9 The supreme court held
the petitioner was estopped to deny the existence of the court in which
he had filed the writ, reasoning that it would not have certiorari
jurisdiction on review of the decision of a nonexistent court. 70 Furthermore, if the City Court had been unconstitutionally created, it would
necessarily follow that there was no court:
There may be a de facto judge of a de jure court, but, in our opinion,
there can be no such thing as a de facto court. We know of no such
anomaly in law as a de facto judge of a de facto court. Before there can
be a de facto officer, there must be a de jure office for him to fill. "An
unconstitutional act is not a law. It confers no rights. It imposes no
duties. It affords no protection. It creates no office. It is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."7'
The court dismissed the writ based upon the doctrine of estoppel and
necessarily concluded that an unconstitutional de facto court does not
exist under Georgia law.72 The court stated:

67. See infra notes 86-88, 197-209 and accompanying text.
68. 120 Ga. 670, 48 S.E. 170 (1904).
69. Id. at 673, 48 S.E. at 171-72.
70. Id. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172.
71. Id. (quoting Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)). Cf. Strickland v.
Griffin, 70 Ga. 541, 545 (1883) (holding void fieri facias issued after abolition of court).
This description illustrates why the term "nonexistent" cannot be limited to describing a
nonstatutory de facto court and also shows that Georgia does not distinguish between
nonstatutory and unconstitutional de facto courts in holding their judgments to be void.
72. Id. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172. The conclusion about whether the judgment was void
or voidable was necessary to the holding on certiorari jurisdiction because, under the
statute of that day, only a voidable judgment could be reviewed on certiorari. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. Farmers Supply Co., 143 Ga. 552, 556, 85 S.E. 861, 863 (1915); Frese v. Link,
76 Ga. App. 709, 710, 47 S.E.2d 170, 171 (1948). The court in Wright reasoned that if the
lower court did not exist, its judgments were void, and further that it was logically and
legally impossible to direct a writ of certiorari to a nonexistent court, so certiorari
jurisdiction could not exist. 120 Ga. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172. Conversely, had Wright's
argument about the court's existence led to the conclusion that the judgment was merely
voidable, irregular or erroneous, certiorari jurisdiction would have existed. Id. at 673-74,
48 S.E. at 171-72. In McDonald Justice Lumpkin criticized the rule:
Speaking for myself, I think the rule is not sound. If there is no court at all, the
attempt to make a ruling is a mere assumption of authority. But, if there is a
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[Ihf the petitioner wished, through the writ of habeas corpus, to test the
legal existence of the city court of Wrightsville, he could have done so
by applying to the judge of the superior courts of the circuit, or perhaps
to the ordinary of Johnson county, either of whom has authority to
issue the writ of habeas corpus.7"

The significance of Wright for the de facto court doctrines in Georgia
was confirmed by Bass v. City of Milledgeville,74 in which the defendant
filed for certiorari in the Superior Court of Baldwin County to overturn
a judgment of the Milledgeville police court on the ground that it was an
unconstitutional de facto court.75 The supreme court again held that
"the writ of certiorari will not lie to review a void judgment by a court
legally constituted, or any pretendedjudgment by an individual or body
of individuals assuming to exercise judicial powers without any lawful
authority so to do.""8 The court cited three cases for this proposition.
Murray, which involved a nonstatutory de facto court;77 Wright, which
involved an unconstitutional de facto court;78 and Levadas v. Beach,7 9
which was relevant only to the unavailability of certiorari for review of
void judgments.8" The court went on, reasoning that "[i]f the police
court of Milledgeville has no legal existence, one who is deprived of his
liberty by the person assuming to act as a judge of that court is not
without remedy. He is entitled to a discharge on habeas corpus."81 For
this second proposition the court cited Moore v. Wheeler," which

court with a case before it, I have never appreciated the force of the reasoning by
which it is held that, if the judgment is wrong, the litigant against whom it is
pronounced may have it reversed by certiorari; but, if it is so wrong as to be void,
the injured party cannot get rid of it by that means-in other words, that there
is any inverse ratio between the degree of the wrong and the right to correct it.
143 Ga. at 556, 85 S.E. at 863.
73. 120 Ga. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172.
74. 122 Ga. 177, 50 S.E. 59 (1905).
75. Id. at 177, 50 S.E. at 59.
76. Id. (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "authority" is instructive. See
supra note 54.
77. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
79. 117 Ga. 178, 43 S.E. 418 (1903).
80. Id. at 180, 43 S.E. at 419. Specifically, Levadas involved an argument, addressed
only in dicta, that a judgment was void because it was entered outside the term of court,
which has nothing to do with the existence or constitutionality of the statute creating the
court. Id.
81. 122 Ga. at 177, 50 S.E. at 59.
82. 109 Ga. 62,35 S.E. 116 (1900); accord Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga.345, 133 S.E.2d 367
(1963). The court in Moore stated that:
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permitted a habeas challenge to a void judgment because the underlying
substantive statute was unconstitutional.83
The court in Bass reaffirmed its holding in Wright that the absence of
a statute creating the court, the unconstitutionality of that statute, and
the unconstitutionality of the substantive statute underlying the court's
judgment will all render the court's judgment void.8 4 The reasoning
also indicates that in Georgia the concept of "no legal existence" includes
both a court that does not exist because no statute created it and a court
that purports to exist under an unconstitutional statute. These decisions
eliminated any doubt as to the application of the voidness principle to
a de facto court created by an unconstitutional statute under the plain
language of article I, section II, paragraph V of the 1983 Georgia
Constitution, which expressly provides that an unconstitutional statute
is void. 85 The Wright and Bass decisions further clarify that Murray
does not require the defendant to object to a de facto court's jurisdiction,
and that the issue may be raised by collateral attack. In sum, both
nonstatutory de facto courts and unconstitutional de facto courts in
Georgia are subject to the same analysis as to the validity of judgments,
the preservation of objections, and the availability of collateral attack.
Four conclusions may be drawn from Wright and Bass. First, the
judgments of an unconstitutional de facto court are void in Georgia.
Second, the defendant need not present the constitutional question to the
trial court in the first instance. Third, an unconstitutional de facto
court's judgments are subject to collateral attack by writ of habeas
corpus. Lastly, the rule of voidness applies with particular force in
criminal cases, because the court in Murray was "clear that in a case
involving the liberty of the citizen there can be no such thing as a de
facto court." 6 The first of these conclusions is equivalent to saying
that the judgment is unconstitutional within the meaning of article I,
section II, paragraph V of the 1983 Constitution and void within the
"void for any other cause" language of O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4, which has
existed as part of every Georgia code since at least the 1863 Code. s7

[a]n unconstitutional enactment is never a law; and, if there can be a case in
which a conviction is illegal and without jurisdiction, it seems that such a case is
presented when it appears either that there is no law making criminal the alleged
crime, or authorizing its prosecution in the court wherein the sentence has been
imposed.
109 Ga. at 63, 35 S.E. at 116 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (citing 2 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS § 624, at 1092).
84. 122 Ga. at 177, 50 S.E. at 59.
85. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5.
86. 112 Ga. at 13, 37 S.E. at 114.
87. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 3513 (1863); GA. CODE § 110-709 (Harrison 1933).
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The second and third conclusions are equivalent to saying that this type
of judgment "is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it
becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it."85 The
fourth conclusion speaks for itself as to the gravity of the City Court's
lack of constitutional existence when it is exercising judicial authority
in a criminal case.
b. The De FactoJudge Doctrinesin Georgia. The other Georgia cases
involving the de facto doctrines deal with the de facto judge or de facto
officer doctrine. The Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that a de jure
8 9
office is required if a de facto judge or officer is to have any authority.
9
In Herrington v. State, " the court held that a county policeman whose
office was created by Fulton County ordinance but "ha[d] never been in
existence even under color of legislative enactment" was not a de facto
officer and therefore could be prosecuted for extortion. 91 In dicta the
court distinguished between wholly ultra vires action and action under
color of an unconstitutional statute:
There is an irreconcilable conflict of authority upon the proposition
as to whether or not it is possible that the doctrine of an officer de
facto can be applied to any case without presupposing the existence of
an office [sic] de jure. Much respectable authority can be produced to
the effect that, where an office is provided for by an unconstitutional
act of the legislature, the incumbent of such an office, for the sake of
public policy and the protection of private rights, will be recognized as
an officer de facto until the unconstitutionality of the act has been
judicially determined. On the other hand, there is considerable, and
perhaps a greater, weight of authority directly the reverse.92
The court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Norton v.
Shelby County93 for the proposition that "the acts of a person assuming
to fill and perform the duties of an office which does not exist de jure can
have no validity whatever in law."94 The Georgia Supreme Court

88. O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4; see, e.g., Crutchfield v. State, 24 Ga. 335 (1858); cf.O.C.G.A. §§ 911-60(a), (f), 9-12-16 (1993). One "other cause" for a collateral attack on a judgment occurs
when the law upon which the conviction is based is unconstitutional. Riley, 219 Ga. at 352,
133 S.E.2d at 373.
89. Tarpley v. Carr, 204 Ga. 721, 728, 51 S.E.2d 638, 643 (1949).
90. 103 Ga. 318, 29 S.E. 931 (1898); accord Bedingfield v. First Nat'l Bank, 4 Ga. App.
197, 61 S.E. 30 (1908) (stating judge pro hac vice acted ultra vires when office not provided
for in circumstances).
91. 103 Ga. at 320, 29 S.E. at 931.
92. Id. at 319, 29 S.E. at 931.

93.

118 U.S. 425 (1886).

94.

103 Ga. at 320, 29 S.E. at 931.
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concluded that the county policeman had been engaged in wholly ultra
vires action because the Fulton County commissioners had not been
authorized by the General Assembly to create the office.95
Similarly, in Bedingfield v.First National Bank,9" the Georgia Court
of Appeals addressed the authority of an attorney sitting without
statutory authority as a judge pro hac vice and held that a judgment
entered by the attorney was void.97 The statute provided that when the
regular judge of the court is disqualified, either another county court
judge or an attorney, with the consent of the parties, might serve as
judge pro hac vice.98 The court determined that no statutory office of
judge pro hac vice existed and reasoned that "above all else there must
be an office corresponding with that which he purports to hold. If there
is no office, there can be no officer de facto."99 The court relied on
Hinton v. Lindsay.. and held that for the de facto officer doctrine to
apply, "there must be a specific office, the duties of which the de facto
officer assumes to discharge."'
Turning to general principles in some
jurisdictions that uphold the authority of a person who has the
"reputation" of a judge, the court reasoned that on the facts,
[H]e could not be a de facto judge of the county court, because there is
already a judge of the county court de jure, and it is well settled that
there cannot exist at one and the same time an officer de jure and one
de facto, or even two de facto officers.' °2
Finally, turning to the procedural methods for attacking the judgment,
the court held that an affidavit of illegality was available under Rodgers
v. Evans.'0 ' Although parts of the decision suggest a variant of the
first de facto court doctrine, that is, the lack of an office within a duly
created court, the court analyzed the case as one involving a de facto
judge, but the result was the same: The judgment in the case was
void. 104

95. Id.
96. 4 Ga. App. 197, 61 S.E. 30 (1908); cf Hartshorn v. Bank of Gough, 15 Ga. App.
167, 82 S.E. 805 (1914) (stating constable prohibited by statute from serving as deputy
sheriff had no authority as "special deputy sheriff").
97. 4 Ga. App. at 209, 61 S.E. at 34.
98. Id. at 201, 61 S.E. at 31.
99. Id., 61 S.E. at 32.
100. 20 Ga. 746 (1856).
101. 4 Ga. App. at 201, 61 S.E. at 32.
102. Id. at 202, 61 S.E. at 32.
103. 8 Ga. 143 (1850).
104. 4 Ga. App. at 206, 61 S.E. at 34.
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Since Hinton the procedural rule has been that when the defect in
authority is procedural rather than statutory, the defendant must object
to the authority of a de facto judge or officer or seek a writ of quo
0
warranto"'
The defendant may not collaterally attack the judgment
for the judge's or officer's lack of authority. Later cases apply the same
rule to an unconstitutional de facto judge. In Garcia v. Miller,"°6 the
Georgia Supreme Court held that a judge who held office past the
expiration of his term when no successor was elected because of the
Brooks litigation was a de facto judge entitled to sit until a successor
was qualified. °7 In Murphy v. State,' the court held that the State
Properties Commission had de facto authority when the appointments
of some of its members violated separation of powers."0 9 Similarly, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held in Dominguez v. Enterprise Leasing
Co.," without citation of authority but probably consistent with the
principles later stated in Garcia and Murphy, that a de facto judge may
properly enter judgment when he acts for a duly constituted court but
pursuant to a statute on filling judicial vacancies that may be but has
yet to be declared, unconstitutional."' The other de facto judge cases
involve nonconstitutional defects in the appointment or tenure of

105. See Tarpley, 204 Ga. at 726, 727, 51 S.E.2d at 642. Whether a quo warranto
would serve when no objection was raised to a de facto judge's authority seems doubtful,
but the resolution of that question is not necessary to the present analysis.
106. 261 Ga. 531, 408 S.E.2d 97 (1991).
107. Id. at 532, 408 S.E.2d at 98-99.
108. 233 Ga. 681, 212 S.E.2d 839 (1975).
109. Id. at 683, 212 S.E.2d at 841. There was no attack on the existence or powers of
the commission itself, thus distinguishing the case from the de facto court decisions, which
the court did not cite. To the extent that Murphy was supposed to support a similar result
in a de facto court case, the simple and sufficient answer would be that the rights of an
individual criminal defendant are not at issue in a separation of powers case (or at least
were not here) and that the interest in stability of property transactions might justify that
result while an exercise of power over an accused criminal defendant would not. See
Murray, 112 Ga. at 12-13, 37 S.E. at 114.
110. 197 Ga. App. 664, 399 S.E.2d 269 (1990).
111. Id. at 665, 399 S.E.2d at 270. Leaving aside whether, according to Wright and
Bass, the result in Dominguez should have been otherwise, the decision provides no support
for overruling the de facto court decisions, and under Murray this observation is
particularly true in a criminal case. See supra notes 61-78, infra notes 173-88 and
accompanying text.
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judges." 2 Most of the de facto officer decisions similarly involve minor,
nonconstitutional defects in the purported authority.113
2. The Federal Decisions on the De Facto Doctrines
In Norton v. Shelby County,"4 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the validity of bonds issued by a county board whose creation
violated the state constitution." 5 The Supreme Court first deferred to
state authorities in holding that the actions of a de facto board or court
are void whether taken without statutory authority or under an
unconstitutional authority."6
The Court addressed an alternative
argument that the board's members had authority as de facto judges or
officers, and the Court reasoned that the de facto officer doctrine arises
from "considerations of policy and necessity."" 7 However, the Court
stated:
[Tihe idea of an officer implies the existence of an office which he holds
....

and a public office can exist only by force of law. This seems to

us so obvious that we should hardly feel called upon to consider any
adverse opinion on the subject but for the earnest contention of
plaintiff's counsel that such existence is not essential, and that it is
sufficient if the office be provided for by any legislative enactment,
however invalid ....

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed."'

112. See, e.g., McLendon v. State, 259 Ga. 778, 387 S.E.2d 133 (1990) (concerning
magistrate); Hinton, 20 Ga. at 746 (involving residence of justice of the peace); Westley v.
State, 143 Ga. App. 344, 238 S.E.2d 701 (1977) (changing office of judge pro hac vice to
associate judge).
113. See Hagood v. Hamrick, 223 Ga. 600, 157 S.E.2d 429 (1967) (stating real property
transactions valid as against chairman's change of residence when vacancy had not then
been judicially determined); Varnadoe v. Housing Auth. of Doerun, 221 Ga. 467, 145 S.E.2d
493 (1965) (holding city attorneys ineligible because authority members were de facto
officers); Tarpley, 204 Ga. at 721, 51 S.E.2d at 638 (stating mayor and some councilmen
were de facto officers when former city charter revived after new charter declared
unconstitutional); DeLoach v. Newton, 134 Ga. 739, 68 S.E. 708 (1910) (involving irregular
election of education trustees); Smith & Bondurant v. Meador, 74 Ga. 416 (1885)
(concerning notary public); State v. Giangregorio, 181 Ga. App. 324, 352 S.E.2d 193 (1986)
(involving police officer).
114. 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
115. Id. at 426.
116. Id. at 438.
117. Id. at 441.
118. Id. at 442. The Georgia Supreme Court in Wright quoted the last sentence of this
passage. 120 Ga. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172.
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Canvassing the state court decisions, the Court concluded:
None of the cases cited militates against the doctrine that, for the
existence of a de facto officer, there must be an office de jure, although
there may be loose expressions in some of the opinions, not called for
by the facts, seemingly against this view. Where no office legally
exists, the pretended officer is merely a usurper, to whose acts no
[legal] validity can be attached.'19
The Norton principle was significantly eroded in the civil cases Chicot

County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank 120 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,121 in which the United States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test to determine whether a determination of unconstitutionality will
be given retroactive effect. 122
The Chicot-Lemon balancing test
arguably has itself been eroded by James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia,23 when the Court held that judicial decisions generally are
fully retroactive.' 2 4 The modern application of voidness principles in
federal criminal cases under Griffith v. Kentucky 25 and Teague v.
Lane 26 is likewise substantially different.'27
There is still life in Norton, however, its core propositions for the
authority of de facto courts and judges remain alive and well despite the
changes in more general law on retroactivity and prospectivity. In Ryder
v. United States,12 the Court applied Norton to the unconstitutional
appointments of civilian judges to the federal Court of Military Review,
noting that the petitioner made a timely challenge to the judge's

119. 118 U.S. at 449.
120. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
121. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
122. 308 U.S. at 374; 411 U.S. at 198-99. See Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090
(7th Cir. 1995); United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1980); Kopp v. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, 905 P.2d 1248 (Cal. 1995). Norton also has been distinguished in bond
cases on a variety of grounds. See Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of Polsque Isle County,
60 F. 55 (6th Cir. 1893); Miller v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 85 F. 693 (C.C. S.D. Cal. 1898);
Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., No. 77985, 1996 LEXIS 19 (Mo., Feb. 20,
1996).
123. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). The effect of Jim Beam on Chicot and Lemon in civil cases
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that the Jim Beam rule has far
more in common with the rule of voidness under Norton than it does with the more lenient
principles of Chicot and Lemon.
124. Id. at 535.
125. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
126. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
127. See infra notes 265-78 and accompanying text.
128. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
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constitutional status in the initial adjudication. 129 The Court distinguished decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo 3 ° in which Congress had
been given a reasonable opportunity to correct the defective statute and
stated that "[t]o the extent these civil cases may be thought to have
implicitly applied a form of the de facto officer doctrine, we are not
inclined to extend them beyond their facts."1 3'
3. The Other State Decisions on the De Facto Doctrines
All states that have considered the issue apply the same substantive
rule to the invalidity of the judgments of both statutory de facto courts
and unconstitutional de facto courts, Most jurisdictions, like Georgia,
require the existence of a court or office before permitting a de facto
judge or officer to act, but these jurisdictions are more lenient when the
court or office has both statutory and constitutional existence. A small
but significant minority of states apply the same rules as Georgia on the
two procedural issues, that the lack of constitutional existence need not
be raised in the trial court in the first instance and that habeas corpus
is available to determine the issue. Many other state jurisdictions differ
from Georgia cases on the procedural issues and require that the de
facto court's unconstitutionality be raised in the trial court, on direct
appeal, or in a special proceeding. The other states' decisions present
several arguments that bear reckoning within the context of the de facto
court doctrines, but, in the end, they do not shake the teachings of
Wright and Bass.
a. The De Facto Court Doctrines. The de facto court doctrines in
other states, as in Georgia, arise in the two contexts of nonstatutory and
unconstitutional de facto courts.3 2 The State of Colorado has followed

129. Id. at 182-83.
130. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. 515 U.S. at 184.
132. Three points bear mention on this analysis of other state decisions. First, the
argument that the same principles of lenity favoring the state should be applied in both
de facto court and de facto judge cases is addressed infra in notes 173-88 and accompanying text. Second, no effort is made to determine whether a state decision that the removal
of a court from its county seat renders its judgments void would be applied by the modern
court of that state. Rather, the holding that the judgment was void is taken at face value
for purposes of addressing the two remaining questions-preserving the issue in the trial
court and presenting the issue for the first time on habeas. Finally, because Georgia cases
clearly distinguish between criminal and civil cases involving de facto courts, that
distinction in other states will not be exhaustively parsed.
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the same rules as Georgia. In Ex parte Stout, 3" the Colorado Supreme
Court held that when the court was created by an unconstitutional local
law, its judgments were void and could be attacked for the first time on
habeas.13
New York and Kansas have also addressed judgments entered without
statutory authority and can be read to suggest that the same rule would
apply to courts acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. That
reading is subject to reasonable criticism. In People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb," 5 the New York Court of Appeals held that when a court of
limited jurisdiction rendered cumulative misdemeanor sentences that
exceeded the court's sentencing authority, the judgment was void and
37
36
The court relied on Ex parte Lange"
subject to attack on habeas.'
and held that "[w]hen a prisoner is held under a judgment of a court
made without authority of law, the proper tribunal will, upon habeas
corpus, look into the record so far as to ascertain this fact; and if it be
found to be so, will discharge the prisoner.'' 3' The court further
observed:
A party held only by virtue of judgments thus pronounced, and
therefore void for want of jurisdiction, or by reason of the excess of
jurisdiction, is not put to his writ of error, but may be released by
habeas corpus. It will not answer to say that a court having power to
give a particular judgment can give any judgment, and that a judgment
not authorized by law, and contrary to law, is merely voidable and not
void, and must be corrected by error. This would be trifling with the
law, the liberty of the citizen, and the protection thrown about his
person by the bill of rights and the Constitution, and creating a judicial
despotism. It would be to defeat justice, nullify the writ of habeas
corpus by the merest technicality, and the most artificial process of
reasoning."'
On the other hand, in In re Quinn,4 ° in which the court affirmed a
grant of habeas when a de facto judge's office had been abolished, there

133. 5 Colo. 509 (1881); see In re Allison, 22 P. 820 (Colo. 1889) (involving removal of
court from county seat).
134. 5 Colo. at 515.
135. 60 N.Y. 559 (1875).
136. Id. at 586.
137. 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
138. 60 N.Y. at 572. The New York court's citation of Lange is significant because the
trial court in Lange acted under color of law but its judgment was unconstitutional because
of double jeopardy. 85 U.S. 163, 178 (1873). The conclusion may be drawn that the court
would follow the same rule when the statute granting jurisdiction was unconstitutional.
139. 60 N.Y. at 591.
140. 46 N.E. 175 (N.Y. 1897).
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is dicta suggesting that if the police-court judge had exercised "open or
notorious" possession of the former office, had "the reputation of
continuing to fill it," or had neither "the name nor indicia of the office
which formerly existed," the judge's exercise of de facto authority might
have been upheld.'
The court did not distinguish or even cite
Liscomb, but the dicta clearly relies on Liscomb in the context of an
unconstitutional de facto court.1 2 The New York Court of Appeals in
Curtin v. Barton,'43 however, which did cite Carroll, suggested by its
careful focus on the existence of the office that the de facto judge
doctrine cannot provide a surrogate for the existence of a de jure
office.'
In In re Norton, 4 ' the Supreme Court of Kansas addressed the
legality of a court with criminal jurisdiction.'4 6 The statute required
a majority vote in a public election, but the vote failed.' 47 The court
held that the de facto officer doctrines should not be applied to a de facto
court by stating that "[w]hile there is some authority for this conclusion,
and while cases may arise where it would be proper to so hold, yet mere
form or color of an office should not be permitted to stand between a
citizen and his liberty."4 ' The court's later statements that "[tihere
had been ...no court created. . . , nor was there any such condition as
would give color to its existence" and that "[t]he want of power in the
court of common pleas to try the petitioner does not arise from any
latent defect in the law creating or conferring jurisdiction, which
notwithstanding might have given color to its existence as a court," do
leave the door open to a distinction between the two types of de facto
courts. 4 9 The court's rejection of "mere form or color of an office"
strongly suggests, however, that the result would be the same when the
judgment is rendered by an unconstitutional de facto court.5 °

141. Id. at 176. This reasoning is also apparent in State v.Carroll, 38 Conn. 449
(1871), which is addressed infra at notes 158-59 and accompanying text,
142. 46 N.E. at 92.
143. 34 N.E. 1093 (N.Y. 1893).
144.

Id. at 1094.

145. 68 P. 639 (Kan. 1902).
146. Id. at 639.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 640.
149. Id.
150. Id. A reading of Norton as applying to unconstitutional de facto courts further
follows from the court's reference to latent constitutional defects. Id. The Supreme Court
of Kansas used the same term to refer to constitutional defects that can be ascertained only
by reference to the underlying circumstances to which the statute applied in City of Topeka
v. Dwyer, 78 P. 417 (Kan. 1904). It would be reasonable to infer that "patent" constitutional defects would not provide form or color of authority. Id. at 420-21.
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The courts of at least twenty-one other states have held that the
judgments of an unconstitutional de facto court may be directly attacked.
The appellate courts of Alabama, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin have permitted direct challenges to the
jurisdiction of a court organized under an unconstitutional statute. 5 1
None of the decisions shed clear light on the availability of habeas in a
criminal case. The courts of Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington require the issue to be
raised in the trial court in the first instance. 5 ' The courts of Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota have held that a de
facto court's existence and constitutionality can be challenged only in a
direct action brought by the state for that purpose. 5 ' Missouri has
held that habeas is available to challenge an unconstitutional exercise
of geographic jurisdiction, 4 but other decisions of that state are to the
contrary.'
Two courts, Minnesota and North Carolina, have expressly held that habeas is not available to challenge an unconstitutional de

151. See Brandon v. State, 173 So. 251 (Ala. 1936); King Lumber Co. v. Crow, 46 So.
646 (Ala. 1908); People v. Toal, 24 P. 603 (Cal. 1890); State v. Malcom, 226 P. 1083 (Idaho
1924); Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 82 So. 280 (La. 1919);
State v. Searcy, 20 S.W. 186 (Mo. 1892); State v. City of Camden, 28 A. 82 (N.J. 1893);
Coyne v. State, 153 N.E. 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926); Fenelon v. Butts, 5 N.W. 784 (Wis.
1880).
152. See Watson v. State, 724 S.W.2d 478 (Ark. 1987); Walker v. Arkansas Dep't of
Human Servs., 722 S.W.2d 558 (Ark. 1987); Tumbs v. State, 718 S.W.2d 105 (Ark. 1986);
Wendt v. Berry, 157 S.W. 1115 (Ky. 1913); State v. Poulin, 74 A. 119 (Me. 1909); People
v. Townsend, 183 N.W. 177 (Mich. 1921); State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey, 118 N.W. 676 (Minn.
1908); State ex rel. McLeod v. Court of Probate, 223 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1975); Beaver v. Hall,
217 S.W. 649 (Tenn. 1920); Thulemeyer v. Jones, 37 Tex. 560 (1872); Anderson v. State,
195 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946); State ex rel. Farmer v. Edmonds Mun. Ct. of
Snohomish County, 621 P.2d 171 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Higgins v. Salewsky, 562 P.2d 655
(Wash. Ct. App. 1977). Arkansas has permitted an unconstitutional de facto court's
jurisdiction on a writ of prohibition, Logan v. Harris, 210 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1948) and
declaratory judgment, Landthrip v. City of Beebe, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1980).
153. See Burt v. Winona & St. Paul P.R. Co., 18 N.W. 285 (Minn. 1884); Searcy, 20 S.W.
186 (Mo. 1892); In re Hans, 119 N.W.2d 72 (Neb. 1963); State ex rel. Madden v. Crawford,
295 P.2d 174 (Or. 1956); State v. Ness, 65 N.W.2d 923 (S.D. 1954). See also State ex rel.
Blaisdell v. Billings, 57 N.W. 206 (Minn. 1893).
154. Exparte Slater, 72 Mo. 102 (1880).
155. In Searcy the Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished Slater as good law but
inapplicable because the defendant had not challenged the court in which he filed the writ.
20 S.W. at 188. The analysis is similar to that of Wright v. Davis in Georgia. See supra
notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Other decisions from Missouri do not fully eludicate
the means of challenging an unconstitutional de facto court. See Ex parte Snyder, 64 Mo.
58 (1876) (permitting habeas in nonstatutory de facto court for criminal case); Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting habeas for illegal
sentence).
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facto court, at least when jurisdiction is not challenged in the trial court
in the first instance. 5 ' Finally, the decision in one other state,
Hawaii, involved a nonstatutory de facto 57court and thus is inconclusive
as to an unconstitutional de facto court.1
b. The De Facto Judge Doctrines. The leading case on the de facto
judge or officer doctrines is the decision of the Connecticut Supreme
Court in State v. Carroll.5 ' Relying primarily on English authorities,
the court in Carrollheld that the judgments of a de facto judge might be
legitimate in a number of circumstances, including when the de facto
judge has gained the reputation of a judge." 9 The broader implications of Carroll would sweep away all distinctions among nonstatutory,
unconstitutional, and procedural defects in the appointment, election,
tenure, or other claim of authority of a de facto judge in favor of a
laissez-faire regime of judicial authority. Thus, while Carroll has
frequently been applied to legitimate a de facto judge's actions pursuant
to an unconstitutional or procedurally defective statute, it has not been
applied to legitimate de facto judicial action taken in the entire absence
of authority.
The de facto judge or officer decisions fall into two groups on the
question of such a judge's authority. The courts of at least thirty-two
states, including Georgia, have held that a de jure office must exist
before either a de facto judge's or officer's actions are valid, but the
decisions usually arise on direct review and do not clearly suggest that
a habeas petition will lie. 6 ° The Connecticut Supreme Court has
156. See State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey, 118 N.W. 676; State v. Shuford, 38 S.E. 808 (N.C.
1901).
157. See O'Daniel v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 377 P.2d 609 (Haw. 1962).
158. 38 Conn. 449 (1871).
159. Id. at 464.
160. As to Georgia, see supra notes 89-113 and accompanying text. The other 31 states
are: Gates v. City of Terakee Springs, 954 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1998); Arnold v. Hilts, 155
P. 316 (Colo. 1916); State ex rel. James v. Deakyne, 58 A.2d 129 (Del. Super. Ct. 1948);
Tobler v. Beckett, 297 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Territory v. Mattoon, 1913 WL
1671 (Haw. 1913); State v. Malcom, 226 P. 1083 (Idaho 1924); People ex rel. Stuckart v.
Knopf, 56 N.E. 155 (Il. 1900); Town of Decorah v. Bullis, 1868 WL 199 (Iowa 1868); In re
Norton, 68 P. 639 (Kan. 1902); Lile v. City of Powderly, 612 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981); State v. Ferguson, 108 So. 2d 520 (La. 1959); Grooms v. LaVale Zoning Bd., 340 A.2d
385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Brockman v. Brockman, 317 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); Burt v. Winona & St. Paul P.R. Co., 18 N.W. 285 (Minn. 1884); Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Sav. Co. v. Gaskill, 201 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1947); In re Hans, 119 NW.2d 72 (Neb.
1963); State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 231 P.2d 599 (Nev. 1951); Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne,
68 A. 90 (N.J. 1907); Wagner v. Borough of Lodi, 152 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959); State v. Blancett, 174 P. 207 (N.M. 1918); In re Quinn, 46 N.E. 175 (N.Y. 1897); Idol
v. Street, 65 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. 1951); In re Wingler, 58 S.E.2d 372 (N.C. 1950); Farrington
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reaffirmed its earlier suggestion in Carroll that a de facto judge or
have statutory and constitutional authority in all
officer need not
161
circumstances.
The decisions stating procedural requirements for this kind of
challenge are multifarious, but taken together, suggest that an
unconstitutional de facto judge's judgments are valid unless challenged
in the trial court or, in some states, by special proceeding. They further
suggest that habeas is not available. The supreme courts of Louisiana
and Nebraska have held that the actions of a nonstatutory de facto judge
or officer are void and subject to collateral attack, 162 and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico has suggested that in a direct appeal the same
result would occur.6 3 The courts of Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin
have invalidated the actions of a nonstatutory de facto judge when the
issue was presented to the trial court and on direct appeal. 4 The
Supreme Court of Texas has invalidated an unconstitutional de facto
judge's decision on direct review.16 ' Nevada's Supreme Court has
invalidated an unconstitutional de facto judge's decision on the state's
quo warranto proceeding. 66 The supreme courts of New Mexico, South
Carolina, and Tennessee have held that an unconstitutional de facto
judge's authority may not be challenged on habeas, 167 and the courts
of Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and South
Dakota would likely follow suit based on their prior de facto court
decisions. 168 Finally, a New York superior court entertained a habeas
petition as to an unconstitutional de facto judge but then held, as in an

v. New England Inv. Co., 45 N.W. 191 (N.D. 1890); Koch v. Keen, 255 P. 690 (Okla. 1927);
State ex rel. Madden v. Crawford, 295 P.2d 174 (Or. 1956); Keeling v. Pittsburg, Virginia
& Charleston Ry., 54 A. 485 (Pa. 1903); State v. Ness, 65 N.W.2d 923 (S.D. 1954); Bankston
v. State, 908 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tenn. 1995); Hamrick v. Simpler, 95 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. 1936);
Ex parte Bassitt, 19 S.E. 453 (Va. 1894) (dicta); State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d
482 (W. Va. 1970); State ex rel. Gillespie v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1970); State ex
rel. Elliott v. Kelly, 143 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1913); see Jones v. State Bd. of Trustees, 505
S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974).
161. See Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319 (Conn. 1970); State v.
Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871).
162. See Garnier v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 8 So. 2d 611 (La. 1942); In re Norton, 68
P. 639 (Kan. 1902).
163. See State v. Doe, 570 P.2d 595 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).
164. See Brockman v. Brockman, 317 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Coyne v. State,
153 N.E. 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926); Fenelon v. Butts, 5 N.W. 784 (Wis. 1880).
165. See State v. Gillette's Estate, 10 S.W.2d 984 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
166. Malone, 231 P.2d 599 (Nev. 1951).
167. See In re Santillanes, 138 P.2d 503 (N.M. 1943); State ex rel. McLeod v. Court of
Probate of Colleton County, 223 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1975); Bankston v. State, 908 S.W.2d 194
(Tenn.1995).
168. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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outright refusal to permit collateral attack, that the judgment would be
presumed valid.'69
4. Commentary on the De Facto Doctrines
The de facto judge or officer cases are relevant to the City Court of
Atlanta's problems only to the extent that they provide wise counsel
either that an unconstitutional de facto court's judgments should be
deemed constitutional unless challenged in the trial court, or that the
writ of habeas corpus should be unavailable in that case. The constitutional and statutory law of Georgia suggests that there may be no room
for this counsel, wise or otherwise.
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned in In re Norton that the de facto
judge doctrines cannot be held to control the analysis of a de facto court
case:
There must be a reality in the existence of the court that undertakes
to deprive one of his liberty. In all cases where the acts of de facto
officers have been upheld, there existed a de jure office. The strongest
reasoning why the acts of de facto officers are sustained is that the
office is created by the public, and put in operation as a part of a
system of organized society, and a continued administration of the
office becomes necessary to the proper adjustment of its affairs and to
the perpetuity of the system. This reasoning loses force when we
undertake to apply it to a de facto office. Such office, not having been
created by the public, and not having been adopted into the organized
system, never becomes a part of it, and170 its displacement does not
disturb the harmony of the organization.
Likewise, the New York decisions suggest the same result, 171 and
172
nothing in the Georgia cases suggests anything to the contrary.
The contrary state decisions that apply de facto judge analysis to de
facto court cases are unpersuasive and should not be followed by Georgia
courts for three reasons. First, those contrary decisions apply notions of
public policy, 73 necessity, 74 importance of the public acts, 175 public

169. People ex rel. Gross v. Hayes, 149 N.Y.S. 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
170. 68 P. at 640.
171. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 61-113 and accompanying text.
173. State v. Poulin, 74 A. 119, 121 (Me. 1909); Beaver v. Hall, 217 S.W. 649, 654
(Tenn. 1920); see Rath v. LaFon, 431 P.2d 312, 314 (Okla. 1967).
174. Poulin, 74 A. at 121. Cf. Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine of State Necessity in
Pakistan, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 341 (1983).
175. State ex rel. Farmer v. Edmonds Mun. Ct., 768-69, 621 P.2d 171, 175 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980).
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reliance, ' hardship on the community or litigants,177 and concern
for individual officials' liability 178 to rescue statutes and systems of
authority from the consequences of their unconstitutionality. Many of
the de facto judge or officer decisions confuse the interests at stake in
criminal cases and in civil cases. 179 The decisions in civil cases are
grounded in the need to protect other citizens in their private affairs, as
in juvenile, marriage, public bond, and related cases.18 0
To the
contrary the constitutional protections for criminal defendants are
paramount in criminal cases, and the right to be subjected only to the
authority of a de jure court constitutionally and statutorily organized
should not be treated as a matter of a judicial "last clear chance,"
requiring the defendant to object to that exercise of unlawful power."'
To the extent that the public or community has relied upon the
unconstitutional jurisdiction of a court to impose a criminal judgment,
it has done so in derogation of the constitution and any reliance is
unreasonable."2
The Maine Supreme Court in Poulin professed:
[W]e are unable to discover any difference in reason for declaring an
officer to be de facto, whether he holds a de facto or de jure office, if he
has occupied it with the usual insignia of a de facto officer. The
authorities are in harmony that the de facto doctrine was invented to
deal with effects, not with causes. The effects only can be reached.
The causes cannot. The official acts are accomplished. If the effects
are alike, it is immaterial that the causes differ. The effects, whether
from a de jure or a de facto office, are alike. Hence the acts of the
officer occupying either position should be declared de facto." 3
In Norton the Kansas Supreme Court provided an ample response to the
foregoing.8 4
Furthermore, the de facto officer doctrine was not
invented to clean up judicial messes after the fact, but to distinguish
unlawful and unconstitutional exercises of power that should be held
void from acts that have a sufficient cloak of authority and regularity as

176. Poulin, 74 A. at 121.
177. Hamrick v. George, 378 P.2d 324, 330 (Okla. 1963); Beaver, 217 S.W. at 654.
178. Hamrick, 378 P.2d at 330; Beaver, 217 S.W. at 654.
179. See Tumbs v. State, 718 S.W.2d 105 (Ark. 1986) (uncritically applying policy
arguments from civil and juvenile status cases in criminal context); State ex rel. Bales v.
Bailey, 118 N.W. 676 (Minn 1908) (applying civil policy arguments).
180. Beaver, 217 S.W. at 654.
181. See supra notes 132-57 and accompanying text (requiring objection in de facto
judge case).
182. 217 S.W. at 652.
183. 74 A. at 122.
184. 118 U.S. at 444-45.
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to require a citizen's objection before being subjected to them. The
Maine court's muddled understandings of the various de facto doctrines,
to say nothing of its ignoring basic principles of state authority in a
constitutional system, can be compared to the Tennessee Supreme
Court's grounding its decision in Beaver in the self-proving proposition
that defendants would "escape the punishment that the courts have said
should be meted out to them."" 5 The courts in Poulin and Beaver
differ only in that the court in Beaver was more candid, because both
decisions display a remarkable disrespect for the rights of criminal
defendants to be tried by a duly constituted tribunal.'
The second reason why contrary decisions should not be followed is
that unconstitutional de facto doctrines in criminal cases involve an
unconstitutional legislative action, upon which the executive has acted
against a criminal defendant and then receives the blessing of the
judicial branch. This practice is nothing more nor less than an
interbranch conspiracy against the criminal defendant, and dressing it
up in the language of an opinion does not change its nature. It is fair
to say that this vice is equally present in both de facto court and de facto
judge cases, but the judicial branch should minimize the circumstances
in which it legitimates unconstitutional actions by the other two
branches of government by refusing to countenance an unconstitutional
de facto court's exercise of power under purported public authority.
Finally, the state decisions that permit an unconstitutional de facto
court to enter judgments, that refuse the writ of habeas corpus, and that
suppose de facto judge analysis to be applicable to de facto court cases
are inconsistent with the Georgia authorities discussed above."8 7 The
de facto court doctrines have survived intact in Georgia for over a
century, through forty-seven years of amending the 1877 Constitution,
through the 1945 and 1976 Constitutions, and now through seventeen
years under the 1983 Constitution.8 8 They represent the principled
triumph of the rule of law over a rule of expediency and should not be
abandoned.
III.

REMEDIES IN THE GEORGIA COURTS

The nature of the City Court's existential and jurisdictional defects
provides defendants in the Georgia courts with two alternatives for
attacking the City Court's judgments: direct attacks at the trial and

185.
186.
187.
188.

217 S.W. at 654.
Id.
See supra notes 61-113 and accompanying text.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5. See also supra notes 37-42.
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appellate levels and collateral attacks including state habeas corpus,
potentially through a class action. The City Court's constitutional
problems can be raised immediately by numerous defendants, in
numerous classes of cases, and in four courts, making highly desirable
an early and expeditious decision by the Georgia Supreme Court.'89
A.

The City Court and Direct Appeals

The City Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at
any point in the process of initial adjudication or direct review of the
judgment. First, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
by the defendant during the prosecution or defense in the City Court of
Atlanta, prior to the entry of judgment, either by a motion to dismiss or
a plea in bar. 9 ' Second, the issue may be raised by a motion in arrest
of judgment.9 filed during the same term of court in which the
judgment was rendered.'9 2 Lastly, the issue may be raised for the first
time on appeal from a judgment of conviction.' 93 If the appeal is

189. Three of the four courts are the City Court of Atlanta itself, the Georgia Supreme
Court, and the Superior Court of Fulton County. The Superior Court of Fulton County
might be presented with the issue on certiorari in a case involving an ordinance conviction,
on writ of prohibition or habeas corpus, or in a Section 1983 action. The fourth court is the
Georgia Court of Appeals, to which most appeals from the City Court are taken.
190. See Murray v. State, 112 Ga. 7, 37 S.E. 111 (1900); cf. Maldonado v. State, 240 Ga.
App. 497, 523 S.E.2d 917 (1999) (stating defendant must raise issue of de facto judge's
authority); Hicks v. State, 231 Ga. App. 552, 553, 499 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1998). Although
an order denying a motion to dismiss in a civil case and most of those motions in a criminal
case are interlocutory and require certification under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b), a motion to
dismiss or a plea in bar that raises a fundamental objection to the proceeding itself may
be subject to immediate review under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) as a final order. See
CHRISTOPHER J. MCFADDEN, EDWARD C. BREWER, III & CHARLES R. SHEPPHARD, GEORGIA
APPELLATE PRACTICE, §§ 4-6, 4-14, 13-8, at 163, 171, 333-34 (1996). In this regard, the City

Court's lack of constitutional existence and subject matter jurisdiction seem equally
fundamental as, for example, a plea of double jeopardy, one of the more common uses of
the plea in bar. See id. § 13-8. An interlocutory appeal would be equally justified under
the "public importance" rationale of Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000).
191.

See O.C.G.A. §§ 17-9-60 to -63 (1997); see also GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE,

supra note 190, § 5-4, at 181-82; cf McDonald v. State, 126 Ga. 536, 55 S.E. 235 (1906)
(stating motion in arrest ofjudgment not proper when indictment was void). A motion for
new trial and a motion to set aside judgment are not proper for this purpose. State v.
McCrary, 193 Ga. App. 11,387 S.E.2d 10 (1989); GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE, supra note

190, § 5-3, at 179-81.
192. See O.C.G.A. § 17-9-61(b) (1997); see also Bowen v. State, 144 Ga. App. 329, 333,
241 S.E.2d 431,435 (1977); Edward C. Brewer, III,Appeals, Interlocutoryand Discretionary
Applications, and Post Judgment Motions in the GeorgiaCourts: The CurrentPracticeand
the Need for Reform Legislation, 44 MERCER L. REV. 17, 45 (1992).

193. See Bowen, 144 Ga. App. at 337, 241 S.E.2d at 437 (citing Parker v. Bond, 47 Ga.
App. 318, 170 S.E.331 (1933)); see also Ward v. State, 248 Ga. 60, 61 n.1, 281 S.E.2d 503,
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pending in the Georgia Court of Appeals, where most appeals from City
Court misdemeanor convictions are taken, the appeal may be transferred
to the Georgia Supreme Court upon presentation of the constitutional
issue.19

It may well be noted that the City Court of Atlanta may raise these
questions sua sponte and arguably has a duty to do so. In B & D
' the court of
Fabricators v. D.H. Blair Investment Banking Corp., 95
appeals held that the trial court has the same duty as an appellate court
to examine its own jurisdiction.'9 6
B.

State Habeas Corpus Petitions
1. Generally

The City Court's lack of constitutional existence and subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised in a Georgia habeas corpus proceeding.'97

504 n.1 (1981) (stating when issue is likely to be a matter of habeas review, court will
address on direct appeal).
194. See Kolker v. State, 193 Ga. App. 306, 387 S.E.2d 597 (1989) (concerning
constitutional question of municipal court jurisdiction), opinion after transfer,260 Ga. 240,
391 S.E.2d 391 (1990); see also In re T.A.W., 214 Ga. App. 1, 447 S.E.2d 136 (1994), opinion
after transfer, 265 Ga. 106, 454 S.E.2d 134 (1995). With due regard for the court's ability
to dismiss an appeal filed in the wrong court, an appeal pending in the Georgia Court of
Appeals may be transferred to the Georgia Supreme Court when a constitutional issue is
presented. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37 (1995); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 8; GA. CT. R. 31, 34;
GA. CT. APP. R. 32(c); see also Marr v. Georgia Dep't of Educ., 264 Ga. 841,452 S.E.2d 112
(1995) (resolving problem of timeframes in discretionary cases); GEORGIA APPELLATE
PRACTICE, supra note 190, § 6-2. The danger of dismissal would exist for the defendant
who learned of the City Court's existential and jurisdictional problems prior to taking an
appeal but took an appeal to the court of appeals anyway.
195. 220 Ga. App. 373, 469 S.E.2d 683 (1996).
196. Id. at 375, 469 S.E.2d at 686.
197. Space limitations have prevented a more complete discussion of other forms of
legal relief, but the following should be noted. In City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111,
90 S.E.2d 583 (1955), the constitutionality of the first Traffic Court of Atlanta was attacked
by declaratory judgment. The writ of prohibition might be available under South Carolina
Railroad v. Ells, 40 Ga. 88 (1869); Doughty, Pearson & Co. v.Walker, 54 Ga. 595 (1875);
McGriffv. State ex rel. Graham, 135 Ga. 259, 69 S.E. 115 (1910); Ormond v.Ball, 120 Ga.
916, 48 S.E. 383 (1904); and Mills v. Bell, 136 Ga. 687, 71 S.E. 1120 (1911). But see
Jersawitz v. Riley, 269 Ga. 546, 500 S.E.2d 579 (1998) (finding appeal from conviction
usually adequate remedy); Shantha v. Municipal Ct. of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 280, 240 S.E.2d
32 (1977). The availability of relief probably would not vitiate a state habeas petition:
despite O.C.G.A. section 9-6-40 (1982), the Georgia Supreme Court has entertained
simultaneous writs of habeas corpus and prohibition without comment. See Henry v.
James, 264 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994). This simultaneous pleading would seem to be
permitted by the ability to plead in the alternative under the Civil Practice Act. See
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Section 9-14-1(c) of the O.C.G.A. provides that "[any person restrained
of his liberty as a result of a sentence imposed by any state court of
record may seek a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of
the restraint."'9 8 The petition must be brought in a superior court,' 99
and it must allege a "substantial denial" of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. 0 0 Furthermore, only one petition may be filed unless the
issues presented in a subsequent petition could not reasonably have been
raised in the original or amended petition.2 '
Several Georgia Supreme Court decisions define the scope of habeas.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to attack a judgment that is void
under O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4,02 under Riley v. Garrett.2 3 Likewise,
the supreme court held in Fleming v. Lowry 20 4 that the writ is appropriate when it is contended that the trial court was without jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. 2" The court's holding in Wright
v. Davis20 6 also necessarily includes the conclusion that the writ is
appropriate to attack the constitutional existence of a trial court. °7
In Hammock v. Zant, °5 the court held the writ also extends to cases
in which the substantive law under which the defendant has been tried
is unconstitutional. 2 9 Both the statute and these decisions make clear

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-10 (1993).
The ability to raise the City Court's problems in federal sentencing or habeas seems
doubtful unless the federal courts could be persuaded that those problems raise due process
concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the sentence enhancement of certain
state misdemeanors under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G.
§§ 4AL.1(b)-(e), 4A1.2(c), the legality of a state sentence may not be considered for the first
time on federal sentencing. See United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1993);
but see generally Cross v. Lackawanna County District Attorney, 204 F.3d 453 (3d Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 2000 WL 694197 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000); United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972). Likewise, a state constitutional issue probably is not cognizable in federal
habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(b), (c), 2255 (1994) (discussing when
habeas appropriate from state court judgments).
198. O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(c) (1993).
199. Id. § 9-14-43.
200. Id. § 9-14-42(a).
201. Id. § 9-14-51.
202. Id. § 17-9-4 (1997).
203. 219 Ga. 345, 133 S.E.2d 367 (1963).
204. 173 Ga. 894, 162 S.E. 144 (1931).
205. Id. at 895, 162 S.E. at 144. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Paulinski, 397 A.2d
760 (Pa. 1979), although upholding the magistrate court on the merits, the appellate court
held that habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy for an allegation that the magistrate
court had been abolished in a state constitutional change.
206. 120 Ga. 670, 48 S.E. 170 (1904); see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
207. 120 Ga. at 674, 48 S.E. at 172.
208. 243 Ga. 259, 253 S.E.2d 727 (1979).
209. Id. at 259-60, 253 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting Moore, 109 Ga. at 62, 35 S.E. at 116).
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that a habeas petition is available to challenge all judgments of the City
Court rendered after April 4 or July 1, 1996 and those judgments
rendered after March 24 or July 1, 1988, include same-occurrence
misdemeanor convictions.
There are four further issues that require examination for a Georgia
habeas petition: (1) the time limits on a habeas petition; (2) the existence
of direct or collateral consequences of the same-occurrence misdemeanor
conviction; (3) the question of prior presentation or disposition of the
issue during the initial prosecution; and (4) the retroactive and
prospective application of judicial decisions in criminal cases and the
relationship of those doctrines to the writ of habeas corpus. The
response to each is in favor of the defendant challenging the judgment,
except in the case of a defendant's failure to appeal an adverse
jurisdictional ruling by the trial court.
2. Timing of a Habeas Petition
There is no time limit in Georgia, whether in limitations or laches, for
a habeas petition based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or
unconstitutionality of a statute when the conviction is based on a
nontraffic-related misdemeanor. The defendant's direct appeal must be
completed before the writ can be filed. 21" Relying on O.C.G.A. sec2
tion 17-9-4 and Mason v. Carter,
' the Georgia. Court of Appeals in
21 2
Barrett v. State held that laches is not a bar to a habeas petition.21 3 In Mason the supreme court held that an attack under
O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4 on a void civil judgment is not barred by any
statute of limitations. 21 4' The supreme court later held in Murphy v.
Murphy21 5 that the three-year limit of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60(f) for
attacking a judgment based on a nonamendable defect appearing on the
face of the pleadings does not apply to a judgment that is void under
O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4.21 s The Barrett decision suggests that the
same principles apply a fortiori in a criminal case, and given the greater

210. See Horton v. Wilkes, 250 Ga. 902, 302 S.E.2d 94 (1983) (stating habeas may not
be filed until conviction is final); Kearse v. Paulk, 264 Ga. 509, 448 S.E.2d 369 (1994);
Jackson v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 755, 154 S.E.2d 228 (1930):
211. 223 Ga. 2, 153 S.E.2d 162 (1967)..
212. 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400 (1987), overruled on othergrounds by Gonzalez
v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 673, 425 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1993).
213. 183 Ga. App. at 730, 360 S.E.2d at 401.
214. 223 Ga. at 4, 153 S.E.2d at 164.
215. 263 Ga. 280, 430 S.E.2d 749 (1993).
216. Id. at 283, 430 S.E.2d at 752.

2000]

CITY COURT OF ATLANTA

interests at stake, it is hard to understand how the rule could be
otherwise.
A traffic misdemeanor case is a different matter, in part. Section 4013-33 of O.C.G.A. places a 180-day time limit on challenges to "a
misdemeanor conviction of any of the traffic laws of this state or the
traffic laws of any county or municipal government,"217 which under
Earp v. Boylan 218 is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.2" 9 Although it might have some effect on raising the
City Court's unconstitutional existence, the statute is inapposite on its
face to the problems of the City Court's jurisdiction. First, a sameoccurrence misdemeanor is by definition not a traffic misdemeanor.2 2 °
Second, a traffic ordinance violation in the City Court of Atlanta is not
a "misdemeanor conviction of any of ... the traffic laws of ... [a]
" ' because an ordinance violation is not a
municipal government"22
2
misdemeanor.

3. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine
The writ of habeas corpus may be filed by a defendant actually in
physical custody,223 but the writ also is in favor of defendants subject
to other restraints or consequences as the result of a conviction. Under
Lillard v. Head,224 a defendant who is incarcerated beyond the term
of a lawful sentence can file a petition. Likewise, under Cochran v. City
of Rockmart, 2 ' a defendant in custody for an ordinance violation can

217. O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33 (1997). This provision applies by its terms to all collateral
attacks on a traffic misdemeanor judgment. See Walker v. State, 199 Ga. App. 701, 703,
405 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1991).
218. 260 Ga. 112, 390 S.E.2d 577 (1990); see Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 407 S.E.2d
737 (1991).
219. A due process challenge on the ground of the short time-frame seems doomed to
failure and is not considered here. On the other hand, whether this time limit violates
article I, section 2, paragraph 5 of the 1983 Constitution by effectively constitutionalizing
an unconstitutional statute is worth considering. More generally, the argument seems well
taken that the 180-day limit should not be applied to defects of the fundamental nature of
existence and subject matter jurisdiction.
220. See 1996 Ga. Laws 627, 628, § 3(1), (2).
221. O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33 (Supp. 2000).
222. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-4 (1999) (stating crimes are statutory offenses); see also Poole
v. State, 229 Ga. App. 406, 409, 494 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1997) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
223. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(c) (1993).
224. 267 Ga. 291, 476 S.E.2d 736 (1996).
225. 242 Ga. 732, 251 S.E.2d 259 (1978). Because an ordinance violation is not a
misdemeanor, see O.C.G.A. § 16-1-4 (1999), it may well be that it is not a misdemeanor
within the enhancement provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See infra
notes 284-91 and accompanying text. If it is not, the only ground for habeas relief that
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file a petition. In Parris v. State,22 6 the Georgia Supreme Court held
that a state petitioner who alleges that a federal sentence was enhanced
by his unconstitutional state conviction can file a petition under the
principles of adverse collateral consequences. 22' The court in Parris
further noted that there might be other adverse collateral consequences
that justify a petition for the writ even when the defendant is not
presently incarcerated.228 Under Baker v. State,229 the defendant has
the burden of pleading and proving adverse collateral consequences.230
The writ is also available to a defendant who, though not in custody,
suffers some other consequence or detriment as a result of a conviction.
A City Court judgment cannot be the basis for a denial of first-time
offender status under O.C.G.A. sections 42-8-60 to -66,231 a prior-felony
enhancement under O.C.G.A. section 16-11-133,232 a three-strikes
enhancement under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-7,233 or a death penalty
enhancement under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-30234 because the City
Court hears only misdemeanor and ordinance cases. 235 The City
Court's judgments may appear as part of the presentence report at
sentencing in a felony case,236 although their effect depends upon their
significance on the record as a whole.
There are other circumstances in which the existence of a conviction
237
in the City Court may be significant. In Hardison v. Martin,
the
court held that a driver's license revocation was a sufficient restraint to
support the writ when the defendant shows that he is suffering from
significant detriments in employment or other collateral consequences. 238 The existence of a City Court misdemeanor conviction could

may exist for an ordinance-only defendant who has served the sentence may be an
argument that the "points" from the conviction are creating a substantial restraint on
liberty.
226. 232 Ga. 687, 208 S.E.2d 493 (1974); cf. Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330, 216 S.E.2d
89 (1975) (rejecting concurrent sentence doctrine in felony case because of potential adverse
collateral consequences doctrine).
227. 232 Ga. at 690, 208 S.E.2d 496.
228. Id. at 688-91, 208 S.E.2d at 494-96.
229. 240 Ga. 431, 241 S.E.2d 187 (1978).
230. Id. at 431-32, 241 S.E.2d at 188.
231. O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -66 (1997 & Supp. 2000).
232. Id. § 16-11-133 (1999).
233. Id. § 17-10-7 (1997).
234. Id. § 17-10-30.
235. 1996 Ga. Laws 628, § 3.
236. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2(a) (1997).
237. 254 Ga. 719, 334 S.E.2d 161 (1985); see Earp v. Lynch, 257 Ga. 633, 362 S.E.2d
55 (1987).
238. 254 Ga. at 721, 334 S.E.2d at 164.
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affect a sixteen-to-eighteen-year-old criminal defendant's ability to obtain
first-offender treatment under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-3(c). 239 Under
Huff v. McLarty,2' ° a defendant whose judgment allows a choice
between payment of a fine and imprisonment may use the writ.
The problem of whether a traffic fine without imprisonment may
constitute a significant restraint on liberty, which could affect the ability
of some City Court defendants to launch collateral attacks on judgments
already final for purposes of direct review, may be answered in part by
the Georgia "points" system. In this system, points are assessed on a 15point/24 month scale for both statutory and ordinance-based traffic
violations, and excessive points can result in a driver's license suspension."' Any defendant who has lost a driver's license to points and
who can make the factual showing required by Hardison can argue that
he or she suffers from a "significant restraint on liberty" just as
burdensome as that suffered by a driver whose license was suspended
for multiple DUI violations.242 The more difficult question is that of
the driver who is not incarcerated and whose points are not so high that
the City Court's judgment has resulted or is likely to result in a
suspension because the only detriment presently suffered is a fine, which
is not a restraint on liberty.243
4. Issues Presented for the First Time on Habeas
The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have
laid down several rules for presenting issues for the first time on habeas.
The supreme court held in Simmons v. State244 and the court of
appeals held in Barrett245 that a petitioner may challenge the constitu-

tionality of a criminal statute for the first time in a habeas petition.246
247 the supreme court held that the failure
Furthermore, in Hardison,

239. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3(c) (1997).
240. 241 Ga. 442, 246 S.E.2d 302 (1978); accord In re Catalano, 623 P.2d 228 (Cal.
1981); see Chaplin v. State, 141 Ga. App. 788, 234 S.E.2d 330 (1977) (stating fine need not
be paid under protest) (overruling Edwards v. City of Albany, 136 Ga. App. 488, 221 S.E.2d
681 (1975)); see also Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E.2d 455 (1974) (stating choice
does not deny equal protection to indigent defendant).
241. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 (c)(1)(B) (1997).
242. A license suspension for multiple DUI violations is imposed under O.C.G.A.
section 40-5-63 (1997), not section 40-5-57.
243. See Turner v. Courson, 181 Ga. 517, 518, 182 S.E. 855, 856 (1935).
244. 246 Ga. 390, 271 S.E.2d 468 (1980).
245. 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400 (1987), overruled on othergrounds by Gonzalez
v. Abbott, 262 Ga. 671, 673, 425 S.E.2d 272 (1993).
246. 246 Ga. at 391, 271 S.E.2d at 469; 183 Ga. App. at 400, 360 S.E.2d at 730.
247. 254 Ga. 719, 334 S.E.2d 161 (1985).
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to present on direct appeal an issue properly cognizable on habeas does
not prevent the habeas petition.24 s Under Barnes v. State,24 9 a habeas-worthy issue presented at trial but not determined against the
defendant does not bar a future habeas petition. 2 0 A contrary rule
applies, however, when the issue was in fact presented to the trial court
and decided against the defendant. In Barnes the court relied on White
v. Hornsby2s 1 for the proposition that the defendant must seek direct
review of the trial court's decision.252
Similarly, under Moore v.
Burnett,5 3 if the defendant appealed the decision and the appeal was
not pursued to its conclusion, the defendant will be barred by res
judicata from presenting the issue on habeas.254 Finally, if an issue
25 5
was decided on appeal, the supreme court held in Brown v. Ricketts
that the issue may not be raised again on habeas.256
In Stevens v. Kemp257 and in Hammock v. Zant,25 s the supreme
court held that the rules of res judicata may not apply to a habeas
petition when there has been a significant change in the law such as26a0
25 9
In Thcker v. Kemp
holding that a statute is unconstitutional.
2 1
and in Jarrell v. Zant,
the court held that a successive habeas
petition may be permissible in a "new law" case.262 To the extent that
additional equities were required for successive habeas petitions in a
nondeath-penalty case, the questions of the City Court's existence and
same-occurrence misdemeanor jurisdiction present these equities.263

248. Id. at 722, 334 S.E.2d at 164-65.
249. 244 Ga. 302, 260 S.E.2d 40 (1979).
250. Id. at 303, 260 S.E.2d at 41. A failure to pursue a ruling on this kind of objection
seems on its face to be fraught with danger as a potential waiver. See Crawford v. State,
254 Ga. 435, 330 S.E.2d 567 (1985); Ale-8-One of Am., Inc. v. Graphicolor Servs., Inc., 166
Ga. App. 506, 305 S.E.2d 14 (1983). The decisions in Crawford and Graphicolorare
perhaps distinguishable from Barnes on the ground that both cases involved procedural
rather than fundamental error, but whether that distinction is viable is beyond the scope
of this Article.
251. 191 Ga. 462, 12 S.E.2d 875 (1941).
252. Id. at 463-64, 12 S.E.2d at 876.
253. 215 Ga. 146, 109 S.E.2d 605 (1959).
254. Id. at 147, 109 S.E.2d at 605.
255. 233 Ga. 809, 213 S.E.2d 672 (1975).
256. Id. at 811, 213 S.E.2d at 673.
257. 254 Ga. 228, 230, 327 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1985).
258. 243 Ga. 259, 253 S.E.2d 727 (1979).
259. 254 Ga. at 230, 327 S.E.2d at 185; 243 Ga. at 260 n.1, 253 S.E.2d at 728 n.1.
260. 256 Ga. 571, 351 S.E.2d 196 (1987).
261. 248 Ga. 492, 284 S.E.2d 17 (1981).
262. 256 Ga. at 573, 351 S.E.2d at 198; 248 Ga. at 492 n.1, 284 S.E.2d at 17 n.1.
263. The present issues have lain uncovered for 12 years since 1988, and 4 years since
1996, primarily because the stakes are not high enough at the time of trial in most
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The Georgia courts could be expected to apply the same principles under
article I, section II, paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution and
O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4, not only when the question is one of constitutionality but also when the question goes to the court's existence or lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.2 4 Thus, the present issues should be
permitted even in a successive state habeas petition.
5. Retroactivity, Prospectivity, and Habeas Relief
The present arguments against the City Court's existence and jurisdiction are based entirely on existing Georgia law, but could be said to
involve a new rule of law, raising questions of retrospectivity and
prospectivity of any decision by the Georgia Supreme Court. Those
issues will be addressed, given the likelihood that they may be presented
in any litigation over the City Court's judgments.
In Taylor v. State,26 the Georgia Supreme Court adopted "the
'pipeline' approach [of Griffith v. Kentucky," 6 ] that is, that a new rule
of criminal procedure ...

will be applied to all cases then on direct

review or not yet final."267 The Georgia Supreme Court also held in
Thrpin v. Todd 268 that the pipeline rule does not permit a new procedural issue to be applied in a habeas case when the new decision was

misdemeanor cases to justify the level of research and analysis necessary to uncover the
unconstitutionality of the 1988 and 1996 statutes. By comparison, the unconstitutionality
of the tax procedure statutes at issue in Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 408 S.E.2d 788 (1991),
appeal after remand 262 Ga. 461, 421 S.E.2d 705 (1992), was not determined for 38 years
after the enactment of the earliest among them in 1953. 261 Ga. at 580-81, 408 S.E.2d at
792. Further, these City Court issues could not reasonably have been presented in earlier
cases because of their obscurity and lack of accessibility to most Georgia attorneys,
circumstances exacerbated by the very nonuniformity that has troubled the Georgia courts
for more than a century and that remains a problem at the heart of article VI, section 10
and article XI of the 1983 Constitution. On the other hand, it is fair to say that when the
1988 and 1996 statutes were passed, anyone considering carefully how to craft the statutes
constitutionally was faced with a fairly simple analysis: the 1967 amendment, the 1983
Constitutional provisions, and the 1986 continuation amendment. See Brewer, Judicial
Engine, supra note 7, at 1017-29.
264. See supra notes 61-113 and accompanying text.
265. 262 Ga. 584, 422 S.E.2d 430 (1992).
266. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
267. 262 Ga. at 586, 422 S.E.2d at 432. The corresponding prospectivity rule in civil
cases, stated in Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983), is based
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97
(1971).
268. 268 Ga. 820, 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997).
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rendered after final judgment in the underlying criminal case. 269 It
would appear that Simmons, Stevens, and Hammock27 describe an
exception permitting an issue to be presented for the first time on
habeas corpus that is more liberal than the federal counterpart, 271 but
federal analysis bears mention because the City Court's defects come
even within the narrower federal rule. In Teague relying on Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Mackey v. United States,272 the United States
Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner may raise a defect
in the criminal proceedings not presented on direct review when the
273
right infringed is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
It is beyond cavil that a court's existence and jurisdiction are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," as both the United States Supreme
Court and the Georgia Supreme Court have treated those issues.274 In
Ex parte Siebold,2 7 an early decision on the proper scope of a federal
habeas petition under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Supreme Court
considered whether it had jurisdiction over a habeas petition raising the
unconstitutionality of the substantive statute under which the defendant
was convicted. 276 The Supreme Court stated:
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some
special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a
prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of
jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other
matter rendering its proceedings void.
This distinction between an erroneous judgment and one that is
illegal or void is well illustrated by the two cases of Ex parte Lange (18
Wall. 163) and Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18.277

269. Id. at 830-31, 493 S.E.2d at 909. Because habeas will not lie in Georgia until the
judgment is final, see supra text accompanying note 210, the effect of Turpin is that a new
rule of criminal procedure ordinarily cannot be the basis for habeas relief.
270. See supra notes 208-09, 244-46, 257-59 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. Earp v. Boylan, 260 Ga. 112, 113, 390 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1990) (holding state
writ may be limited as to time because substantively broader than federal rule).
272. 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
273. 489 U.S. at 307.
274. See supra notes 61-88, 114-31 and accompanying text.
275. 100 U.S. 371 (1879); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83
(1998) (stating subject matter jurisdiction must be decided before merits of case because
it goes to question of court's authority); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 435 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (calling subject matter jurisdiction a more fundamental question
than procedural error).
276. 100 U.S. at 374.
277. Id. at 375. The Court in Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873), permitted a double
jeopardy argument to be heard on habeas, and the Court held in Ex parteParks, 93 U.S.
18 (1876), that habeas would not lie to determine whether the court had jurisdiction of the
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The above language may be compared to that of the Georgia statutes
regarding void judgments. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 17-9-4, "[t]he
judgment of a court having no jurisdiction over the person or subject
matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be so held
in any court275when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to
consider it."
C.

Habeas Corpus Class Actions

The Georgia Supreme Court's holdings in Nelson v. Zant27 9 and
Johnson v. Caldwell5 ° that a habeas corpus action is subject to the
Civil Practice Act suggest that the court would join the lower federal
courts and the majority of state courts that have embraced the possibility of the habeas class action or representative action in the nature of a
class action. Subject only to the limitations and problems posed by the
"one-petition" statute, a habeas class action could be an effective means
for resolving the present issues.2 8'

cause and the person of the defendant. Id. at 21.
278. O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4 (1997). In Teague, 489 U.S. at 309, the Court cited Paul M.
Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARV.
L. REV. 441 (1963), in discussing what lacks of jurisdiction should be cognizable on habeas.
Professor Bator cited In re Mayfield, 114 U.S. 107 (1891), which involved subject matter
jurisdiction, as an example of a jurisdictional question appropriate for decision in a habeas
case. Bator, supra, at 469 n.65. Professor Bator also argued, more generally, that the
availability ofjurisdictional argument on habeas could be determined under the principles
outlined in section 10 of the Restatement of Judgments:
(1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally attack the
judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by
the policy against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction.
(2) Among the factors appropriate to be considered in determining that collateral
attack should be permitted are that
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
Bator, supra, at 461 &n.35 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942)). The City
Court is, of course, a classic example of a court of limited jurisdiction as described in
Section 10.
279. 261 Ga. 358, 358-59, 405 S.E.2d 250, 250-51 (1991).
280. 229 Ga. 548, 551-52, 192 S.E.2d 900, 902-03 (1972).
281. The Georgia class action has been considered by several authors. See Jeffrey G.
Casurella & John R. Bevis, Class Action Law in Georgia: Emerging Trends in Litigation,
Certification,and Settlement, 49 MERCER L. REV. 39, 39, 55-56 (1997); Howard 0. Hunter,
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The United States Supreme Court has not expressly determined
whether a habeas class action is available under Federal Rule 23282
but has permitted joint proceedings in habeas corpus when common
questions were presented. 2"
The Court has noted also that the
Federal Rules have limited application in habeas cases under Federal
Rule 81(a)(2) 284 and that the discovery process should not be applied
to prejudice the writ.2" 5 In the lower federal courts, mandatory (b)(2)
classes have been certified in both immigration and death penalty
habeas cases,2 86 and class actions have been certified in a variety of
other habeas cases.28 7 Other federal courts have held that although

Georgia Investment Co. v. Norman-The Supreme Court Creates a New Form of Class
Action for Georgia, 24 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1973); see also Dean S. Daskal & S. Ross
Mansbach, Class Struggle: The Troubled History of the Class Action in Georgia, GA. B.J.,
Apr. 1998, at 34. See generally Mulling v. Wilson, 245 Ga. 773, 267 S.E.2d 212 (1980)
(concerning Section 1983 class challenge to peace bond procedures). A more recent decision
bearing on whether typicality is a factor in Georgia class actions is Taylor Auto Group, Inc.
v. Jessie, 241 Ga. App. 602, 604, 527 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1999) (involving three factors of
numerosity, commonality, and adequacy of representation, including competent counsel and
absence of conflicting interests).
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 261 n.10 (1984); United
States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (finding named representative in
habeas class action has standing to appeal denial of certification despite mootness of
individual claim); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 565 n.1 (1975) (noting habeas class claims without further comment); see also
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (stating habeas not sole remedy for constitutional
violations in criminal procedure); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (involving
relationship of civil rights action and habeas corpus petition). The arguments for and
against class actions for federal habeas corpus petitions were addressed in Developments
in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1170-73 (1970), and Note,
Multiparty FederalHabeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1968).
283. See United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(2).
285. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
286. See Asimus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1996), affd without
discussion of class action issue, 123 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 523
U.S. 740 (1998); In re Mariel Cuban Habeas Corpus Petitions, 822 F. Supp. 192 (M.D. Pa.
1993) (consolidating 37 individual habeas petitions into class action); Fernandez-Roque v.
Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (concerning Cuban inmates' habeas class action),
modified, 91 F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1981), later opinion, 539 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1982),
rev'd on merits, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
287. See, e.g., Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982) (drawing distinction
between habeas and civil rights actions for juvenile detainees); Hartmann v. Scott, 488
F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973) (involving persons confined in state hospital); In re Class Action
Application for Habeas Corpus on Behalf of All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D.
Tex. 1985); Streicher v. Prescott, 103 F.R.D. 559 (D.D.C. 1984) (civil committees); Adderly
v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (prisoners, pre-Preiser);see Cox v. McCarthy,
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class actions are not available, a representative habeas action in the
nature of a class action is available.2"' But a small minority have
rejected habeas class actions, either in general or on the facts.289
A majority of the state supreme courts that have considered the issue
have approved class actions for habeas corpus petitions. In Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinski v. Isaac,290 a habeas class action was used to
challenge the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania magistrate court's
jurisdiction, essentially the same use proposed as that for the City Court
of Atlanta. 291 Habeas class actions have been approved, mostly by
intermediate courts of appeals, in California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Michigan, and Washington. 9 2 In Ohio at least one intermediate
appellate court has acknowledged the possibility of a habeas class
action."' On the other hand, a significant minority of state courts,

829 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta) ('a class action may lie in habeas corpus"); United
States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (habeas class action
for juveniles decided on merits). Cf. Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848 (1st Cir.
1978) (civil rights action).
288. See United States v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1976); Bijeol v. Benson, 513
F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975); Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd in
pertinent part, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,
506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974); Faheem-El v. Klincar, 600 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ill. 1984),
preliminary injunction rev'd on othergrounds, 841 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1988). Cf. Cleveland
v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975) (involving consolidated habeas petitions).
289. The decisions holding that habeas class actions are not available as a matter of
law are Carter v. Jeffes, 1988 W.L. 76121 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 1988) (describing review of
state criminal judgments as involving "case by case" remedies including habeas) and Hill
v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (stating nature of habeas precludes class action). The
decisions rejecting habeas on factual grounds are Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250
(9th Cir. 1978) (denying military habeas class due to predominance of individual issues);
Jackson v. Justices of SuperiorCourt of Massachusetts,549 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating
named plaintiffs must have standing); and Browne v. Estelle, 544 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977)
(stating recidivists must have standing).
290. 397 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1979).
291. Id. at 762-63.
292. See In re Head, 195 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), on later appeal, 721 P.2d
65, (Cal. 1986); Rhyne v. Municipal Ct. of the N. Judicial Dist. of San Diego County, 170
Cal. Rptr. 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981);
Dunn v. Jenkins, 377 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. 1978); Beaver v. Chaffee, 579 P.2d 1217 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1978); Pressley v. Lucas, 186 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Johnson v. Moore,
496 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1972); see also In re Branson, 190 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983);
Supreme Court ex rel. Cardona v. Singerman, 312 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). But
see State ex rel. Williams v. Purdy, 242 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
293. See Harshaw v. Farrell, 380 N.E.2d 749 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977); see also Pegan v.
Crawmer, 653 N.E.2d 659 (Ohio 1995); A.W. v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Dept., 1984 W.L.
14000 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1984) (holding class action inappropriate due to individualized inquiry into habeas for release of child).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Colorado, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, have
rejected habeas class actions based upon rationales inconsistent with the
principles of habeas corpus and class actions in Georgia.294
As attractive as a habeas class action may be for the efficient
determination of the City Court of Atlanta's constitutional problems, a
significant potential limitation exists in the habeas corpus statute.
Under O.C.G.A. section 9-14-51,295 a petitioner may bring only one
state habeas petition against a criminal conviction unless the subsequent
petition raises issues that could not reasonably have been presented in
the first petition.29 s This provision will limit the availability of a
habeas class action in three ways. First, the named plaintiffs, who
should in the first instance be first-time filers, must be prepared to raise
any and all other defects in their convictions that are cognizable in
habeas, which may raise adequacy and typicality issues.297 Second,
any petitioner who has already brought a habeas petition raising other
issues must be prepared to argue that the City Court's unconstitutionality falls within the "new law" exception for successive petitions.2 98
Lastly, and more problematically, if the "one-petition" rule of O.C.G.A.
section 9-14-51 were construed to mean that an unnamed class member
had filed his or her first petition by remaining a member of the plaintiff
class, whether by opting in or by failing to opt out, 299 a class action

could have the effect of eliminating those petitioners' other grounds for
review.
There are several potential solutions for this admittedly serious
problem. Two potential rationales that would permit the habeas class
action device to serve a useful function in resolving the City Court's
constitutional problems are as follows: (1) a holding grounded in
statutory construction that a habeas class action does not constitute a
first petition for anyone other than the named plaintiffs;300 and (2) an

294. See Riley v. City & County of Denver, 324 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1958); In re Santiago,
248 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968), affd, 258 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1969); State ex rel. Cox v. Appelton, 309 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Supreme Court
ex rel. Cardona v. Singerman, 312 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); State ex rel. Coats
v. Hunter, 580 P.2d 158 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); Mitchem' v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 895
(W.Va. 1981); State ex rel. Walker v. Jenkins, 203 S.E.2d 353 (W.Va. 1974).
295. O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51 (1993).
296. Id.
297. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a) (1993). On typicality in Georgia class actions, see supra
note 281. Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (requiring four factors of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy).
298. See supra notes 265-78 and accompanying text.
299. See Casurella & Bevis, supra note 281, at 54-58.
300.

See generally HERBERT R. NEWBERG & ALMA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 16.22 (3d ed. 1992). The practical problems with this rule of lenity would seem to be few
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opportunity for unnamed class members to raise additional grounds for
habeas relief in supplementary petitions."°1
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Georgia authorities make clear that the City Court's lack of
constitutional jurisdiction under the 1996 statute and its lack of sameoccurrence misdemeanor jurisdiction under the 1988 and 1996 statutes
are fundamental constitutional defects that can be challenged before the
City Court of Atlanta on motion to dismiss and plea in bar, on direct
appeal from both interlocutory and final orders, and by the writ of
habeas corpus. The City of Atlanta can be expected to defend any and
all of these cases vigorously on the merits. It may be that in the near
future, if not already, the General Assembly will find a solution for the
City Court's ongoing problems in corrective legislation. It is to be hoped,
however, that in the meantime, the City, the defense bar, and the courts
will approach the dispute resolution process cooperatively to see that
these issues are decided in the most efficient way possible and in such
a manner that justice is done for all defendants affected by the City
Court's judgments.

because no criminal defendant is likely to undertake a habeas class action in any other
than the most significant of circumstances.
301. See id. §§ 9.47, 9.61-9.72.
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